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Rational Action

CARL G. HEMPEL

1. Two aspects of the concept of rational action.

To say of an action that it is rational is to put forward an empirical hypothesis and a critical appraisal. The hypothesis is to the effect that the action was done for certain reasons, that it can be *explained* as having been motivated by them; these reasons will include certain ends the agent sought to attain, and his beliefs about available means of attaining them. And the *critical appraisal* implied by the attribution of rationality is to the effect that, judged in the light of the agent's beliefs, his action constituted a reasonable or appropriate choice of means for the attainment of his ends.

Both the critical and the explanatory aspects of the concept of rational action give rise to various philosophical questions. The considerations that follow are an attempt to delineate and explore some of the most important among these.

2. Rationality of action as a critical concept.

2.1. General characterization.

Let us consider first the basic problem of explicating the critical, or normative, idea of rational action. This calls for the elaboration of precise criteria of rationality which might provide us with standards for appraising the rationality of particular actions, and which might thus also afford guidance in making rational decisions.

Rationality in the sense here intended is obviously a relative concept. Whether a given action—or the decision to perform it—is rational will depend on the objectives that the action is meant to achieve and on the relevant empirical information available at the time of the decision. Broadly speaking, an action will qualify as rational if, on the basis of the given information, it offers optimal prospects of achieving its objectives. I will now discuss more closely the key concepts invoked in this characterization: the concepts of the information basis and of the objectives of an action, and finally that of rationality relative to a given basis and given objectives.

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2.2. *The information basis of rational decision and action.*

If we are to choose a rational course of action in pursuit of given ends, we will have to take into account all available information concerning such matters as the particular circumstances in which the action is to be taken; the different means by which, in these circumstances, the given ends might be attained; and the side-effects that may be expected to result from the use of different available means.

The total empirical information that is available for a given decision may be thought of as represented by a set of sentences, which I will call the *information basis* of the decision or of the corresponding action. This construal of the empirical basis for a decision takes account of an obvious but important point: to judge the rationality of a decision, we have to consider, not what empirical facts—particular facts as well as general laws—are actually relevant to the success or failure of the action decided upon, but what information concerning such facts is available to the decision-maker. Indeed, a decision may clearly qualify as rational even though it is based on incomplete or on false empirical assumptions. For example, the historian, precisely in order to present an action by a historical figure as rational, will often have to assume—and may well be able to show on independent grounds—that the agent was incompletely informed, or even entertained false beliefs, concerning relevant empirical matters.

But while the information basis of a rational action thus need not be true, should there not at least be good reasons for believing it true? Should not the basis satisfy a requirement of adequate evidential support? Some writers do consider this a necessary condition of rational action; and this view is indeed quite plausible; for example, as one of its recent advocates, Quentin Gibson, points out, if "someone were, carefully and deliberately, to walk round a ladder because he believed, without evidence, that walking under it would bring him bad luck, we would not hesitate to say that he acted irrationally."¹

No doubt we often understand rationality in this restricted sense. But if we wish to construct a concept of rational action that might later prove useful in explaining certain types of human behavior, then it seems preferable not to impose on it a requirement of evidential support; for in order to explain an action in terms of the agent's reason's, we need to know what the agent believed, but not necessarily on what grounds. For example, an explanation of the behavior of

¹Quentin Gibson, *The Logic of Social Enquiry* (London and New York, 1960), p. 43.

Gibson's ladder-shunner in terms of motivating reasons would have to invoke the man's superstitions beliefs, but not necessarily the grounds on which he holds them; and the man may well be said to be acting quite reasonably, given his beliefs.

2.3. *The objective of rational decision or action.*

From the information basis of a decision let me now turn to its objectives. In very simple cases, an action might be construed simply as intended to bring about a particular state of affairs, which I will call the end state. But even in such simple cases, some of the courses of action which, according to the information basis, are available and are likely to achieve the end state, may nevertheless be ruled out because they violate certain general constraining principles, such as moral or legal norms, contractual commitments, social conventions, the rules of the game being played, or the like. Accordingly, the contemplated action will be aimed at achieving the end state without such violation; and what I will call its *total objective* may then be characterized by a set E of sentences describing the intended end-state, in conjunction with another set, N, of constraining norms.

Again, as in the case of the empirical basis, I will not impose the requirement that there must be "good reasons" for adopting the given ends and norms: rationality of an action will here be understood in a strictly relative sense, as its suitability, judged in the light of the given information, for achieving the specified objective.

2.4. *Basic criteria of rationality of action.*

How can such suitability be defined? For decision situations of the simple kind just contemplated, a characterization can readily be given: If the information basis contains general laws by virtue of which certain of the available courses of action would be bound to achieve the total objective, then, clearly, any one of those actions will count as rational in the given context. If the information basis does not single out any available course of action as a sufficient means for attaining the objective, it may yet assign a numerical probability of success to each of the different available actions, and in this case, any one of those actions will count as rational whose probability of success is not exceeded by that of any available alternative.

2.5. *Broadened construal of objective and of rationality.*

However for many problems of rational decision, the available information, the objectives, and the criteria of rationality cannot be construed in this simple manner. Our construal becomes inapplicable,

in particular, when the objective of a proposed action does not consist in attaining a specified end-state; and this is quite frequently the case, as we will see.

To begin with, even when a particular end-state is to be attained, the available information will often indicate that there are several alternative ways of definitely or probably attaining it, and that these alternatives would be attended by different incidental consequences, such side-effects, after-effects, and the like. Some of these might be regarded as more or less desirable, others as more or less undesirable. In a theoretical model of such situations the total goal must accordingly be indicated, not simply by describing the desired end-state, but by specifying the relative desirability of the different total outcomes that may result from the available courses of action.

In the mathematical theory of decision-making, various models of rational choice have been constructed in which those desirabilities are assumed to be specifiable in numerical terms, as the so-called utilities of the different total outcomes.

If the given information basis specifies the probabilities of the different outcomes, we have a case of what is called *decision-making under risk*. For this case, one criterion of rationality has gained wide acceptance, namely that of *maximizing expected utility*. The expected utility which, on the given information, is associated with a contemplated course of action is determined by multiplying, for each possible outcome of the action, its probability with its utility, and adding the products. An action then qualifies as rational if its expected utility is maximal in the sense of not being exceeded by the expected utility of any alternative action.

One more type of decision-situation deserves brief mention here because of its interesting philosophical implications. This is the case of *decision under uncertainty*. Here the formulation of the problem is assumed to specify the available courses of action, and for each of them its different possible outcomes with their utilities, but not their probabilities. By way of illustration, suppose that you are offered as a present a metal ball that you will obtain by one single drawing made, at your option, from one of two urns. You are given the information that the metal balls are of the same size, and that the first urn contains platinum balls and lead balls in an unspecified proportion; the second urn, gold and silver balls in an unspecified proportion. Suppose that the utilities you assign to platinum, gold, silver, and lead are in the ratio of 1000: 100: 10: 1; from which urn is it rational to draw? Interestingly, several quite different criteria of

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rational choice under uncertainty have been set forth in recent decision theory. Perhaps the best-known of them is the *maximin rule*; it directs us to maximize the minimum utility, that is to choose an action whose worst possible outcome is at least as good as the worst possible outcome of any alternative. In our example, this calls for a drawing from the second urn; for at worst, it will give you a silver ball, whereas the worst outcome of a drawing from the first urn would give you a lead ball. This rule clearly represents a policy of extreme caution, reflecting the pessimistic maxim: act on the assumption that the worst possible outcome will result from your action.

By contrast, the so-called *maximax rule* reflects an attitude of optimism; it directs us to act on the assumption that the best possible thing is going to happen, and hence to choose an action whose best possible outcome is at least as good as the best possible outcome of any alternative. In our example, the proper decision under this rule would be to draw from the first urn; for at best this will give us a platinum ball, whereas a drawing from the second urn can at best yield a gold ball.

Apart from the two rules just considered, several other rules of rational choice have been suggested for decision under uncertainty. The standards of rationality they reflect all have a certain plausibility, yet they conflict with one another: for one and the same decision situation, they will normally single out different choices as optimal.²

The mathematical models here briefly characterized do not offer us much help for a rational solution of the grave and complex decision problems that confront us in our daily affairs. For in these cases, we are usually far from having the data required by our models: we often have no clear idea of the available courses of action, nor can we specify the possible outcomes, let alone their probabilities and utilities. In contexts, however, where such information is available, mathematical decision theory has been applied quite successfully even to rather complex problems, for example in industrial quality control and some phases of strategic planning.

But whatever their practical promise, these models contribute, I think, to the analytic clarification of the concept of rational action. In particular, they throw into relief the complex, multiply relative, character of this concept; and they show that some of the characterizations of rational action which have been put forward in the

²For a lucid statement and comparative analysis of the criteria in question, see R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions* (New York, 1957), Chap. 13.

philosophical literature are of a deceptive neatness and simplicity. For example, Gibson, in his careful and illuminating study, remarks: "there may be various alternative ways of achieving an end. To act rationally . . . is to select what on the evidence is *the best* way of achieving it;³ and he refers to "an elementary logical point—namely, that, given certain evidence, there can only be one correct solution to the problem as to the best way of achieving a given end."⁴ Gibson offers no criterion for what constitutes the best solution. But surely, what he asserts here is not an elementary logical point, and indeed it is not true. For, first, even when the decision situation is of a kind for which one definite criterion of rational choice may be assumed to be available and agreed upon—for example, the principle of maximizing expected utility—then that criterion may qualify several different courses of action as equally rational. Secondly, there are various kinds of decision—for example, decisions under uncertainty—for which there is not even agreement on a criterion of rationality, where maximin opposes maximax, and both are opposed by various alternative rules.

It is important to bear in mind that the different competing criteria of rationality of decision or action do not reflect differences in the evaluation of the various ends which, on the given information, are attainable; all the competing rules here referred to presuppose that the utilities of those ends have been antecedently fixed. Rather, the different decision rules or criteria of rationality reflect different inductive attitudes; different degrees of optimism or pessimism concerning what to expect of the world; and accordingly different degrees of venturesomeness or caution in deciding upon a course of action.

The considerations here outlined concerning the critical or normative notion of rationality have important implications for the explanatory use of the idea of rational action. I now turn to this second topic of my paper.

3. *Rational action as an explanatory concept.*

Purposive human actions are often explained in terms of motivating reasons. The preceding discussion suggests that, if fully stated, a specification of such reasons will have to indicate the agent's objectives as well as his beliefs about such matters as the available means and their likely consequences. This conception is clearly reflected, for example, in R. S. Peters' remark that in such motivational

³Gibson, *loc. cit.*, p. 160 (italics the author's).

⁴*Ibid.*, p. 162.

explanations we "assume that *men are rational* in that they will take means which lead to ends if they have the information and want the ends."⁵ Here, then, we have the idea of an *explanatory* use of the concept of rationality.

Let us now examine the logic of explanations by motivating reasons, and especially the rôle which the attribution of rationality to the agent plays in this context.

3.1. *Dray's concept or rational explanation.*

As our point of departure, let us choose Professor William Dray's stimulating and lucid analysis of this kind of explanation: Dray calls it *rational explanation* because, as he says, it "displays the *rationale* of what was done" by offering "a reconstruction of the agent's *calculation* of means to be adopted toward his chosen end in the light of the circumstances in which he found himself. To explain the action we need to know what considerations convinced him that he should act as he did."⁶ But Dray attributes to rational explanation a further characteristic, which clearly assigns an essential rôle to the evaluative or critical concept of rationality. According to him, the "goal of such explanation is to show that what was done was the thing to have done for the reasons given, rather than merely the thing that is done on such occasions, perhaps in accordance with certain laws."⁷ Hence, "Reported reasons, if they are to be explanatory in the rational way, must be *good* reasons at least in the sense that *if* the situation had been as the agent envisaged it . . . , then what was done would have been the thing to have done."⁸ To show that the agent had good reasons for his action, a rational explanation must therefore invoke, not a general empirical law, but a "*principle of action*," which expresses "a judgment of the form: 'When in a situation of type $C_1 \dots C_n$ the thing to do is x .'"⁹ Thus, there is "an element of *appraisal* of what was done in such explanations."¹⁰ And it is precisely in this reliance on a principle of action expressing an appraisal that Dray sees the essential difference between rational explanations and those explanatory accounts, familiar

⁵R. S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (London and New York, 1958), p. 4 (Italics supplied).

⁶William Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 124 and 122 (italics the author's).

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 126 (italics the authors).

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 132 (italics the author's).

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 124 (italics the author's).

especially from the natural sciences, which explain a phenomenon by subsuming it under covering general laws that describe but do not appraise.

It appears then that according to Dray's conception a rational explanation answers the question 'Why did agent *A* do *x*?' by a statement of the form: '*A* was in a situation of type $C_1 \dots C_n$; and in a situation of that type, the thing to do is *x*'; or briefly: '*A* was in a situation of type *C* (whose description would presumably include a specification of *A*'s objectives and relevant beliefs), and in such a situation, the rational thing to do is *x*'.

Now, this construal of rational explanation clearly presupposes that there is a criterion of rationality which, for the given kind of decision situation, uniquely singles out one particular course of action as "*the* thing to do." However, this assumption seems to be untenable, for reasons indicated earlier.

But, more importantly, even if such a criterion were granted, an account of the form Dray attributes to a rational explanation cannot, it seems to me, do the job of explaining why *A* did *x*. For any adequate answer to the question why a certain event occurred will surely have to provide us with information which, if accepted as true, would afford good grounds for believing that that event did indeed occur—even if there were no other evidence for its occurrence. This seems clearly a necessary condition for an adequate explanation—though of course by no means a sufficient one: producing evidence for the occurrence of an event is not the same thing as explaining it. Now, information to the effect that agent *A* was in a situation of kind *C*, and that in such a situation the rational thing to do is *x*, affords grounds for believing that it would have been *rational for A to do x*; but not for believing that *A* did *in fact* do *x*. To justify this latter belief, we clearly need a further explanatory assumption, namely that—at least at the time in question—*A* was a *rational agent* and thus was *disposed* to do whatever was rational under the circumstances.

But when this assumption is added, the answer to the question 'Why did *A* do *x*?' takes on the following form:

	<i>A</i> was in a situation of type <i>C</i>
(Schema R)	<i>A</i> was a rational agent
	In a situation of type <i>C</i> any rational agent will do <i>x</i>

Therefore *A* did *x*.

This construal of rational explanation differs from Dray's in two respects: First, the assumption that *A* was a rational agent is explicitly

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added; and secondly, the evaluative or appraising *principle of action*, which tells us what is the thing to do in situation C, is replaced by a *descriptive generalization* telling us how a rational agent will act in situations of that kind: but this restores the covering-law form to the explanation.

In thus disagreeing with Dray's analysis of rational explanation, I do not wish to deny that an explanatory account in terms of motivating reasons may well have evaluative overtones: what I maintain is only that whether a critical appraisal is included in, or suggested by, a given account, is irrelevant to its explanatory force: and that an appraisal alone, by means of what Dray calls a principle of action, does not explain at all why A did in fact do x.

3.2. *Explanation by reasons as broadly dispositional.*

The alternative construal which I have so far sketched only in outline now requires a somewhat fuller statement.

The notion of rational agent invoked in Schema R above must of course be conceived as a descriptive-psychological concept governed by objective criteria of application; any normative or evaluative connotations it may carry with it are inessential for the explanatory force of the argument. To be sure, normative preconceptions as to how a truly rational person ought to behave may well influence the choice of descriptive criteria for a rational agent—just as the construction of tests providing objective criteria of intelligence, verbal aptitude, mathematical aptitude, and the like will be influenced by pre-systematic conceptions and norms. But the descriptive-psychological use of the term 'rational agent' (just like that of the terms 'IQ,' 'verbal aptitude,' 'mathematical aptitude,' *et cetera*) must then be governed by the objective empirical rules of application that have been adopted, irrespective of whether this or that person (for example, the proponent of a rational explanation or the person to whom it is addressed) happens to find those objective rules in accord with his own normative standards of rationality.

By whatever specific empirical criteria it may be characterized, rationality in the descriptive-psychological sense is what I will call a *broadly dispositional* trait: to say of someone that he is a rational agent is to attribute to him, by implication, a complex bundle of dispositions, each of them a tendency to behave in characteristic ways in certain kinds of situation (whose full specification would have to include information about the agent's objectives and beliefs, about other aspects of his psychological and biological state, about his environment,

et cetera). To explain a given action by reference to the agent's reasons and his rationality is thus to present it as conforming to, as being an instance of, one of those general tendencies. Roughly speaking, therefore, explanations by motivating reasons have the character of dispositional explanations in the sense examined by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*.¹¹ However, this rough characterization now must be elaborated a little and must also be qualified in certain respects.

To begin with, the dispositions implied by the psychological concept of rational agent are not simply dispositions to respond by certain characteristic overt behavior to specific external stimuli. They differ in this respect from at least some of the dispositions implied when we say of a person that he is allergic to ragweed pollen; for to say this is to imply, among other things, that he will exhibit the symptoms of a head cold when exposed to the pollen. When we call someone a rational agent, we assert by implication that he will behave in characteristic ways if he finds himself in certain kinds of situation; but—and this is a first point to note—those situations cannot be described simply in terms of certain environmental conditions and external stimuli; for characteristically they include the agent's having certain objectives and entertaining certain relevant beliefs. To mark this difference, we might say that the dispositions implied by attributing rationality to a person are *higher-order dispositions*; for the beliefs and ends-in-view in response to which, as it were, a rational agent acts in a characteristic way are not manifest external stimuli but rather, in turn, broadly dispositional features of the agent. Indeed, to attribute to someone a particular belief or end-in-view is to imply that in certain circumstances he will tend to behave in certain ways which are indicative or symptomatic of his belief or his end-in-view. When I say that belief-attributions or end-attributions "imply" certain dispositional statements, the implying in question will usually have to be conceived as being probabilistic in character; but in order not to complicate the discussion of our central problems, I will make no further explicit reference to this qualification.

There is yet another point I wish to indicate by saying that the ascription of a belief, of a goal, or of rationality to a person is only *broadly* dispositional in character; namely, that a statement expressing such an ascription may *imply, but is not tantamount to*, a set of other statements which attribute to the person certain clusters of dispositions. These dispositions constitute symptoms or indices of the person's

¹¹Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London, 1949).

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beliefs, objectives, or rationality; but they do not suffice fully to specify the latter.

Let me try to support this view first by means of a parallel. To say of a physical body that it is electrically charged, or that it is magnetic, is to attribute to it, *by implication*, bundles of dispositions to respond in characteristic, or symptomatic, ways to various testing procedures. But this does not exhaust what is being asserted; for the concepts of electric charge, magnetization, and so on are governed by a network of theoretical principles interconnecting a large number of physical concepts. Conjointly, these theoretical principles determine an infinite set of empirical consequences, among them various dispositional statements which provide operational criteria for ascertaining whether a given body is electrically charged or magnetic or the like. Thus, the underlying theoretical assumptions contribute essentially to what is being asserted by the attribution of those physical properties. Indeed, it is only in conjunction with such theoretical background assumptions that a statement attributing an electric charge to a given body implies a set of dispositional statements; whereas the whole set of dispositional statements does not imply the statement about the charge, let alone the theoretical background principles.

Now, to be sure, the psychological concepts that serve to indicate a person's beliefs, objectives, moral standards, rationality, *et cetera*, do not function in a theoretical network comparable in scope or explicitness to that of electromagnetic theory. Nevertheless, we use those psychological concepts in a manner that clearly presupposes certain similar connections—we might call them *quasi-theoretical connections*. For example, we assume that the overt behavior shown by a person pursuing a certain *objective* will depend on his beliefs; and conversely. Thus, the attribution, to Henry, of the belief that the streets are slushy will be taken to imply that he will put on galoshes only on suitable further assumptions about his objectives and indeed about his further beliefs; such as that he wants to go out, wants to keep his feet dry, believes that his galoshes will serve the purpose, does not feel in too much of a hurry to put them on, *et cetera*: and this plainly reflects the assumption of many complex interdependencies between the psychological concepts in question. It is these assumptions which determine our expectations as to what behavioral manifestations, including overt action, a psychological trait will have in a particular case.

To reject the construal of those traits as simply bundles of dispositions is not to conjure up again the ghost in the machine, so

deftly and subtly exorcised by Ryle and earlier—more summarily, but on basically similar grounds—by the logical behaviorism of Carnap. The point is rather that to characterize the psychological features in question, we have to consider not only their dispositional implications, which provide operational criteria for attributing certain beliefs and objectives to a person: we must also take account of the quasi-theoretical assumptions connecting them; for these, too, govern the use of those concepts, and they cannot be regarded as logical consequences of the sets of dispositional statements associated with them.

3.3. *Epistemic interdependence of belief attributions and goal attributions.*

The quasi-theoretical connections just referred to give rise to a problem that requires at least brief consideration. For our purposes it will suffice to examine one form of it which is of fundamental importance to the idea of rational explanation.

What sorts of dispositions do we attribute to a person by implication when we assert that he has such and such objectives or beliefs? To begin with objectives or ends-in-view: The statement that Henry wants a drink of water implies, among other things, that Henry is disposed to drink a liquid offered him—provided that he *believes* it to be potable water (and provided he has no overriding reasons for refusing to accept it, *et cetera*). Thus, ascription of an objective here has implications concerning characteristic overt behavior only when taken in conjunction with ascriptions of appropriate beliefs. Similarly, in our earlier example, the hypothesis that Henry *believes* the streets to be slushy implies the occurrence of characteristic overt behavior only when taken in conjunction with suitable hypotheses about Henry's objectives.

And indeed it seems that generally a hypothesis about an agent's objectives can be taken to imply the occurrence of specific overt action only when conjoined with appropriate hypotheses about his beliefs; and *vice versa*. Hence, strictly speaking, an examination of an agent's behavior cannot serve to test assumptions about his beliefs or about his objectives separately, but only in suitable pairs, as it were; or briefly, belief attributions and goal attributions are *epistemically interdependent*.

This fact does not create insuperable difficulties in ascertaining a person's beliefs or his objectives. For often we have good antecedent information about one of the interdependent items and then a hypothesis about the other may be tested by ascertaining how the

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person acts in certain situations. For example, we may have good grounds for the assumption that our man is subjectively honest; then his answers to our questions may afford a reliable indication of his beliefs. Conversely, we are often able to test a hypothesis about a person's objectives by examining his behavior in certain critical situations because we have good reasons to assume that he has certain relevant beliefs.

But the epistemic interdependence of belief attributions and goal attributions does raise the question whether an explanation by motivating reasons ever requires the explanatory assumption that the acting person was, at least, at the time in question, a rational agent. How this question arises can be seen by a closer look at the criteria for belief- and goal attributions.

Suppose we know an agent's beliefs and wish to test the hypothesis that he wants to attain goal *G*. Just what sort of action is implied by this hypothesis? It seems clear that the criterion used in such cases is roughly this: If *A* actually wants to attain *G* then he will follow a course of action which, in the light of his beliefs, offers him the best chance of success. In the parlance of our earlier discussion, therefore, the test and the justification of our goal attribution appears to presuppose the assumption that *A* will choose an action that is rational relative to his objectives and beliefs. This would mean that the way in which we use a person's actions as evidence in ascertaining his goals has the presupposition of rationality built into it. An analogous comment applies to the way in which the actions of a person whose objectives we know are normally used as evidence in ascertaining his beliefs. But this seems to discredit the construal of rational explanation as involving, in the manner suggested in Schema *R*, an explanatory hypothesis to the effect that the person in question was a rational agent. For the considerations just outlined suggest that this hypothesis is always made true by a tacit convention governing our attribution of motivating reasons—that is, objectives and beliefs—to the agent. If this is generally the case, then the assumption of rationality could not possibly be violated; any apparent violation would be taken to show only that our conjectures about the agent's beliefs, or those about his objectives, or both, were in error. And undeniably, such will in fact often be our verdict.

But will it always be so? I think there are various kinds of circumstances in which we might well leave our belief- and goal attributions unchanged and abandon instead the assumption of rationality. First of all, in deciding upon his action, a person may well overlook certain relevant items of information which he clearly knows

or at least believes to be true and which, if properly taken into account, would have called for a different course of action. Secondly, the agent may overlook certain items in the total goal he is clearly seeking to attain, and may thus decide upon an action that is not rational as judged by his objectives and beliefs. Thirdly, even if the agent were to take into account all aspects of his total goal as well as all the relevant information at his disposal, and even if he should go through a deliberate "calculation of means to be adopted toward his chosen end" (to repeat an earlier quotation from Dray), the result may still fail to be a rational decision because of some logical flaw in his calculation. It is quite clear that there could be strong evidence, in certain cases, that an agent had actually fallen short of rationality in one of the ways here suggested; and indeed, if his decision had been made under pressure of time or under emotional strain, fatigue, or other disturbing influences, such deviations from rationality would be regarded as quite likely. (This reflects another one of the quasi-theoretical connections among the various psychological concepts that play a rôle in explanations by reasons or by motives.)

In sum then, rationality of human actions is not universally guaranteed by conventions governing the attribution of goals and beliefs in human agents; there may be very good grounds for ascribing to an agent certain goals and beliefs and yet acknowledging that his action was not rational as judged by those goals and beliefs.

3.4. *Rational action as an explanatory model concept.*

So far I have argued three main points concerning the explanatory use of the concept of rational action, namely (i) that explanations by motivating reasons are broadly dispositional in character; (ii) that therefore they conform to the general conception of an explanation as subsuming its explanandum under covering laws (the laws may be of strictly universal or of statistical form, and the subsumption will accordingly be deductive or inductive-probabilistic in character¹²); and (iii) that in explanations by motivating beliefs and ends-in-view, the assumption that the acting individual was a rational agent is not, as it may appear to be, always made true by a tacit convention governing the attribution of beliefs and ends-in-view.

¹²These two types of explanation by covering laws are discussed more fully in my essay "Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explanation" in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III (Minneapolis, 1962).

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For further clarification of the rôle that the assumption of rationality plays in explanations by motivating reasons, it may be illuminating to ask whether the concept of rational agent might not be viewed as an idealized explanatory model comparable to the explanatory concept of an ideal gas, that is, a gas conforming exactly to Boyle's and Charles's laws. No actual gas strictly satisfies those laws; but there is a wide range of conditions within which many gases conform at least very closely to the account the model gives of the interrelations between temperature, pressure, and volume. Moreover, there are more general, but less simple laws, such as van der Waals', Clausius', and others, which explain to a large extent the deviations from the ideal model that are exhibited by actual gases under certain conditions.

Perhaps the concept of a rational agent can similarly be regarded as an explanatory model characterized by an "ideal law" to the effect that the agent's actions are strictly rational (in the sense of some specific criterion) relative to his objectives and beliefs. How could this programmatic conception be implemented? How could an explanatory model of rational action be precisely characterized, and how could it be applied and tested?

As noted earlier, the concept of rationality is by no means as clear and unequivocal as is sometimes implied in the literature on rational explanation. But let us assume that the proposed explanatory use of the concept of rational action is limited, to begin with, to cases of a relatively simple type for which some precise criterion of rationality can be formulated and incorporated into our model.

Then there is still the question of how to apply the model to particular instances, how to test whether a given action does in fact conform to the criterion of rationality the model incorporates. And this raises a perplexing problem. The problem is not just the practical one of how to *ascertain* an agent's beliefs and actions in a given case, but the conceptual one of what is to be *understood* by the beliefs and objectives of an agent at a given time, and what kind of logical device might serve to characterize them. Let me amplify this briefly.

First, a person must surely be taken to hold many beliefs which he is not consciously entertaining at the time, but which could be elicited by various means. Indeed, a person may be held to believe many things he has never thought of at all and perhaps never will think of as long as he lives. For example, if he believes that five and seven are twelve, we would surely take him to believe also that five speckled hens and seven more speckled hens make twelve

speckled hens—although he might never consciously entertain this particular belief. Generally, a man will be taken to believe certain things that are consequences of other things he believes: but surely not all those consequences, since—to mention but one reason—his logical perspicacity is limited.

Hence, while in a theoretical model of the normative or critical concept of rational decision the information basis may be construed as a set of statements that is closed under an appropriate relation of logical derivability, this assumption definitely cannot be transferred to an explanatory model of rational decision. In particular, a person may well give his believing assent to one of a pair of logically equivalent statements but withhold it from the other—although, according to a familiar parlance, both express the same proposition. It seems clear, therefore, that the objects of a person's beliefs cannot be construed to be propositions each of which may be represented by any one of an infinite set of equivalent statements; in specifying an agent's beliefs, the mode of its formulation is essential. (This peculiarity seems closely akin to what Quine has called the referential opacity of belief sentences.¹³)

Presumably, then, in an explanatory model concept of rational action, the agent's beliefs would have to be represented by some set of sentences that is not closed under logical derivability. But what set? For example: should the belief-set for an agent at a given time be taken to include all sentences assent to which could be elicited from him by pertinent questions and arguments, no matter how numerous or complex? Clearly such construal is unwarranted if we are interested in specifying a set of beliefs which can be regarded as motivating factors in explaining an action done by the agent. Where the boundary line of the belief set is to be drawn—conceptually, not just practically—is a puzzling and obscure question.

Quite similar observations apply to the problem of how to characterize an agent's total objectives in a given decision situation. Consequently, though in a normative-critical model of rational decision rationality is always judged by reference to the total information basis and the total objective specified, it would be self-defeating to incorporate into an explanatory model of rational action the

¹³See, for example, W. V. Quine, *Word and Object* (New York, 1960), sec. 30. This section and the subsequent ones through sec. 45 contain incisive analyses of the basic logical problems raised by belief attributions and goal attributions and an illuminating discussion of recent philosophical literature on this subject.

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principle that a rational agent acts optimally, as judged by specified criteria, on the basis of his total set of objectives and beliefs: this latter notion is simply too obscure.

3.5. *The model of a consciously rational agent.*

A way out seems to be suggested by the observation that many rational explanations present an action as rationally determined by considerations which presumably the agent took consciously into account in making his decision. Let us say that a person is a *consciously rational agent* (at a certain time) if (at that time) his actions are rational relative to those of his objectives and beliefs which he consciously takes into account in arriving at his decision.

This "ideal model" of a consciously rational agent seems to yield approximate explanatory and predictive accounts of at least some types of decision or action.

Consider, for example, a competent engineer who seeks an optimal solution to a problem of design or of industrial quality control for which the range of permissible solutions is clearly delimited, the relevant probabilities and utilities are precisely specified, and even the criterion of rationality to be employed (for example, maximization of expected utilities) has been explicitly stated. In this case, the objectives and beliefs which determine the engineer's decision may be taken to be fully indicated by the specification of the problem; and by applying to the engineer the explanatory model of a consciously rational agent (whose standard of rationality is that specified in the given problem), we can explain—or predict—that he will come up with that solution, or set of solutions, which is the theoretically correct one.

The idea of a consciously rational agent, with its very limited scope of application, does not, however, represent the only way in which a model concept of rational decision might be put to explanatory and predictive use. One interesting alternative has been suggested in a study by Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel.¹⁴ These investigators present an empirical theory of human choice which is modeled on the mathematical model of decision under risk and incorporates the hypothesis that the choices made by human subjects will be rational in the precise sense of maximizing expected utilities.

As might be expected, the rigorously quantitative character of the

¹⁴Donald Davidson, Patrick Suppes, and Sidney Siegel, *Decision Making: An Experimental Approach* (Stanford, 1957).

theory has to be purchased at the price of limiting its applicability to decisions of a rather simple type which permit of strict experimental control. In the experiment designed by the authors to test the theory, the subjects had to make a series of decisions each of which called for a choice between two options. Each option offered the prospect of either gaining a specified small amount of money or losing some other specified small amount, depending on the outcome of a certain random experiment, such as rolling a regular die with peculiar markings on its faces. The random experiments, their possible outcomes, and the corresponding gains or losses were carefully described to the subjects, who then made their choices.

The results of the experiment conformed quite well to the hypothesis that subjects would choose the option with the greater expected utility, where the expected utility of an option is computed, in the standard manner, on the basis of theoretically postulated subjective probabilities and utilities which the different outcomes have for the choosing subject. The theory proposed by the authors provides an objective, if indirect, method for the simultaneous and independent measurement of such subjective probabilities and utilities for a given agent. Experimental study shows that the subjective probability which a specified outcome of a given random experiment possesses for a given subject is not, in general, equal to its objective probability, even though the subject may know the latter; nor are the subjective utilities proportional to the corresponding monetary gains or losses. Indeed a person will normally be entirely unaware of the subjective probabilities and utilities which, on the theory under consideration, the possible outcomes possess for him.

Thus, insofar as the theory is correct, it gives a quite peculiar twist to the idea of rational action. Though the subjects make their choices in clearly structured decision situations, with full opportunity for antecedent deliberation and even calculation, they act rationally (in a precisely refined quantitative sense) relative to subjective probabilities and utilities which they do not know, and which, therefore, they cannot take into account in their deliberations; they act rationally in the sense of acting *as if* they were trying to maximize expected utilities. We seem to have here a type of conscious choice which is non-consciously rational with quantitative precision. What might Freud have thought of this?

3.6. *Concluding remarks.*

Obviously, the more familiar instances of explanation by motivating

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reasons do not conform to this special theoretical model. By intent, at least, they come closer to invoking the model of a consciously rational agent. In particular, many of the rational explanations offered in historical writings seem to imply that the given action was the outcome of rational deliberation based on specific beliefs and objectives which the historian, often on very good evidence, attributes to the agent. But since it is impossible for the historian, even under the best of conditions, to ascertain all the considerations that may have entered into the agent's deliberation and may thus have influenced his decision, the most favorable construal that can be given to the explanatory import of such arguments appears to be this effect: The explanans includes the information that the agent had such and such goals and beliefs; and since he acted in a manner to be expected of a rational agent in these circumstances, it is plausible to suppose that whatever other considerations may have figured in his deliberation had no decisive influence on its outcome: in this sense, the agent's decision is accounted for by the specified beliefs and goals.

In explanations of this kind, the relevant sense of rationality is not explicitly defined; rather, it is left to our judgment to put an appropriate construal on the explanatory hypothesis of rationality and to recognize that what was done was rational relative to the adduced reasons.

Practically, this is no doubt often the best we can do by way of explaining an action. But I would not agree with the view that explanations of this kind are perfectly adequate for the purposes of history and that nothing further need be attempted. For since, in their explanations, historians make objective claims, they will have to take into account whatever relevant insights may be provided by the scientific study of motivation and action. And I think it likely that as a result the vague general procedure of explanation by reasons will gradually be replaced, at least in some areas, by the use of more specific explanatory hypotheses, in which our standard notions of rationality may play a less important rôle. The influence which some recent psychological theories, including the ideas of psychoanalysis, have had on the explanation of human action seems to me indicative of this trend.

If such theoretical developments should show that the explanatory power of the concept of rational action is in fact rather limited, we will have to accept this philosophically: after all, in the methodology of explanation we can ill afford to give a general advance endorsement to the saying: "Man is a rational being indeed: he can give reasons for *anything* he does."

Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value*

CHARLES L. STEVENSON

1

The term "relativism," like most other "isms," can safely be used only when it is first defined; so in the introductory part of my paper I shall clarify a sense that is in reasonable accord with philosophical English. I say "in reasonable accord" because the term is in some respects rough, and must be precised if it is to be useful.

I shall then turn to the theory of value, and shall there divide my attention between a relativistic theory and a simplified form of the theory that I have defended in my *Ethics and Language*.¹ I shall want to show that the latter theory, even in its simplified form, has implications that sharply distinguish it from relativism; and I shall particularly want to show this with regard to the *justification* of value judgments—the topic of justifying reasons being one on which my previous work, through faults that are presumably my own, has been seriously misleading.

2

To define "relativism" I must explain what I mean by a relative term, proceeding by example. My first example, though trivial, will serve to introduce the central points.

The word "tall," when predicated of X, normally relates X to something else. But the "something else" isn't always the same thing; it may be one thing or another, depending on the circumstances under which "tall" is uttered. A ten-story building is tall in a village, for instance, but not in New York; for with the change in locality there is a change in the sort of building with which it is compared. Or again, a height of five feet eleven inches may or may not make a

¹New Haven, 1944.

*Presidential address delivered before the Sixtieth Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, May 3-5, 1962.

person tall, depending on whether the person is a woman or a man—or for that matter, depending on whether the person, if a man, belongs to this or that race. So “tall” has a meaning that is more than usually a product of its linguistic and factual context, which provides varying answers to the question, “Tall with respect to what else?”

I accordingly wish to say that “tall” is a relative term. It is a relative term not merely, of course, because it stands for a relation, but because in doing so it is not explicit with regard to one of its relata.

Let me restate this in a slightly different way. In its colloquial use “X is tall” means in part, “X is taller than——.” But if we attempt to fill in the blank, in order to specify the rest of what it means, we find that there is no word or phrase (apart from words that are systematically ambiguous) that we can use in all cases. The blank must be filled in now in one way and now in another, corresponding to the various and implicit meanings that “tall” acquires from the circumstances that attend its use.

The same can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of all other relative terms; and a blank-containing verbal expansion of them, of the sort I have suggested, is perhaps the most convenient device by which they can be handled.²

Let me turn to a further illustration, concerned with the topic of motion. Popular writers on relativity have made us familiar with such cases as this: A speaker seated in a train may say of Mr. X, who is walking past him, “He is moving at three miles per hour”; but a speaker standing near the station, watching Mr. X through the train window as the train goes by, may say of him, “He is moving at much more than three miles an hour.” Both statements may be correct, of course, and this is explained by the reminder that the speakers are using different frames of reference. Now we can say much the same thing in this alternative way: Both speakers, in talking about the rate at which Mr. X is moving, are talking about the rate at which he is changing his distance from——; but they use “is moving” under such different circumstances that we must fill in the blank in different ways—in the one case mentioning some part of the train, say, and in the other case mentioning the station. The term, “is moving,” is accordingly a relative term; and the shifts in its

²When a relative term is expanded into a blank-containing expression, and the blank is appropriately filled in, the resulting term is usually less *vague* than the original one. To that extent the expansions often fail, though harmlessly, to indicate what the relative term, in a given context of utterance, actually means.

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implicit, situation-dependent references readily explain why the speakers' seemingly contradictory remarks are actually compatible.

My expansion of "X is moving" into "X is changing its distance from ——" is too simple, of course, to deal with motion of all kinds; but any complication of it would continue to introduce a blank, and one that can't be filled in once and for all. So although the relativity of motion leads to a sophisticated theory, it begins with the simple point that I have made—that "is moving" is a relative term.

My next example is of interest for showing that a term can be relative in one respect but not in another.

In arguing that man is the measure of all things, it will be remembered, Protagoras spoke of the wine that was sweet to Socrates in health but not sweet to Socrates in illness.³ So perhaps he was saying, in effect, that "is sweet" is a relative term—that is, that "The wine is sweet" can be expanded into "The wine tastes sweet to ——" Or at any rate, perhaps some neo-Protagorean philosopher might defend the view in this slightly revised form. But in doing so, let me say, our neo-Protagorean philosopher would become a poor ordinary-language philosopher. For in the respect now in question "is sweet" can be considered a relative term only when forcibly stretched from its standard use. I say this for the following reason:

When "is sweet" is expanded into "tastes sweet to ——" the blank is really unnecessary. It is necessary only when it has to be filled in in various ways, as is here not the case. For if we accept this general style of definition at all, we can more plausibly eliminate the blank in favor of a phrase with constant meaning, taking "is sweet" to be short for "tastes sweet to most people under normal circumstances." There will be no contexts, accordingly, in which we can expand "The wine is sweet" into "The wine tastes sweet to those who are ill." So if in illness we find that it doesn't taste sweet, and conclude on that ground alone that it isn't sweet, our argument will be plainly invalid. A more complicated definition of "is sweet" would be needed, of course, to preserve the presuppositions and vague suggestions of our language;⁴ but there would still, presumably, be no need of a blank. And without the blank, "is sweet" becomes at most a relation-designating and relatum-designating term; it does not become a relative term.

³Plato, *Theaetetus*, 159.

⁴Cf. Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), Chap. IV, particularly pp. 96f.

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And yet there is another respect—a trivial one, to be sure, having no bearing on the problems of Protagoras or of any other philosopher—in which “is sweet” clearly *is* a relative term. For “is sweet” is often a short way of saying “is sweet comparatively speaking”; and in such cases it can readily be expanded into “is sweeter than ———.” When in Burgandy, for instance, a traveler may say that a certain white wine is sweet; but when in Bordeaux, speaking of a wine of equal sweetness, he may say that it isn’t sweet. His remarks, though seemingly at variance with one another, may involve no more than a change in his standard of comparison.

Examples of this sort, where the same term is relative in one respect but not in another, are by no means infrequent in our language. They remind us that statements of the form, “T is a relative term,” are often too general to be of interest in themselves. They may regain their interest, however, once the respect in which T is a relative term is pointed out—as can readily be done by specifying the blank-containing phrase into which T can be expanded.

A relative term, then, stands both for a relation and for this or that relatum; and with regard to the latter it is so inexplicit that its meaning must be grasped from the circumstances under which it is uttered. Let me make clear that it is *more than usually* inexplicit about the relatum. Ever so many terms have this unexplicitness to some degree, but comparatively few of them have it to the degree that my examples have illustrated. There will doubtless be border-line cases, but not, I think, troublesome ones. And there are clear cases not only of terms that are relative but also of terms that are not—the latter including “made entirely of iron,” for example, or “having a temperature of twenty degrees Centigrade.” It may be well to note that such expressions as “taller than the Eiffel Tower,” and “is changing his distance from the station at Brattleboro, Vermont”—obtained from my expansions of relative terms by filling in the blanks in a particular way—are not themselves relative terms.

3

Once “relative term” has been defined, it becomes a very simple matter to define “relativism.” For the sense I want to emphasize, relativism is a type of analysis that takes certain of our terms to be relative terms, its purpose (which it may or may not attain) being to guard our discourse from confusion.

But let me attempt to speak a little more accurately. I suggest that “relativism,” with regard to the general topic Z, can instructively

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be used to name a meta-theory which claims that the key terms used in discussing Z are relative terms. So relativism with regard to motion takes "moves," "accelerates," *et cetera*, to be relative terms; relativism with regard to perception makes the same claim about ever so many adjectives used in describing perceivable objects; relativism with regard to truth makes the same claim about "true" and its near synonyms; and so on. We shall want to exclude, however, those cases in which the key terms are taken to be relative only in some trivial or obvious respect, for the name "relativism" would there be too ponderous to be appropriate. One does not become a relativist about heights, for instance, merely because he accepts my initial example of "tall." And a parallel qualification is needed, of course, for terms that are relative only in atypical contexts.

There are unquestionably other senses that could be given to "relativism,"⁵ but this sense seems to me particularly important—important because it stays close to the issues that philosophers (if I may judge by their examples) have wanted to discuss, and because it brings their issues into sharper focus.

4

Let me now turn to the theory of value, with which the rest of my paper will be concerned. The terms that relativism there takes to be relative terms are "good," "bad," "right," "beautiful," and so on; and although the *respect* in which it takes them to be relative need not be the same for all forms of the view, the one that is usually emphasized, and the only one that I shall here need to discuss, involves a varying reference to these or those people and their differing attitudes.

So in its main form a relativistic theory of value is simply one that expands "X is good," for example, into "X is approved by ———." For certain cases the word "approved" may have to give place to some other attitude-designating term, such as "liked," "favored," or "esteemed"; but in all cases there is some counterpart of the

⁵The definition given by Richard Brandt, in *Ethical Theory* (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1959) is not far removed from my definition, but there are some differences. See Chapter XI of his book, particularly pp. 272, ff. His section on Methodological Relativism (pp. 275-278) can profitably be compared with my discussion on that topic in Section 7. An earlier and much discussed account of Relativism will be found in *The Concept of Morals*, by W. T. Stace (New York, 1937), particularly Chaps. I and II.

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blank. And for varying utterances of "good," relativism maintains, we must fill in the blank now with a reference to the speaker, now with a reference to some group to which the speaker belongs, now with reference merely to most or to many people at many or most times, now with reference to certain people who are particularly familiar with X, and so on. The only restriction is that the people must be specified by factual terms; for the use of evaluative terms would only renew the question about their meaning, and would also fail to insure that "reduction" of values to facts which relativists, in naturalistic fashion, normally seek to establish.

It may easily happen, according to relativism, that the conditions under which "good" is uttered are not sufficient to indicate whose attitudes are in question. We must then ask the speaker to be more explicit. And this should be no more surprising, relativism implies, than the parallel situation in physics. When a man who is talking about motion leaves room for doubt about the frame of reference he is using, we must in that case too ask him to be more explicit.

I think I am correct in suggesting that my definition precises a sense of "relativism" that is of philosophical interest. It has no connection, of course, with the view that an action's value depends upon, and thus is "relative to," the circumstances in which it occurs; but that is as it should be, since the latter view tends to be shared by relativists and non-relativists alike. Socrates, for instance, can scarcely be called a relativist; yet he took it for granted that the value of an act depended on the circumstances, as is evident from his remarks about returning a deposit of arms to a man who is not in his right mind.

My sense is one in which relativism has its forefather in Protagoras; it is close to the professed relativism of Lanz⁶ in ethics and Pottle⁷ in aesthetics; and it is sometimes evident, by implication, in the writings of social scientists and historians. Finding that people's evaluations vary with their attitudes, and differ from place to place and from time to time, these writers draw or imply a conclusion about what the evaluative terms can be taken to mean. One might expect them to conclude that the terms always describe the attitudes of the speaker, or of some group by whom the speaker is influenced; and

⁶Henry Lanz, *In Quest of Morals*.

⁷Frederick Pottle, *The Idiom of Poetry* (Ithica, N. Y., 1932).

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that is in fact the emphasis in Westermarck's⁸ relativism; but perhaps the other relativists consider such uses, though frequent, to be provincial—the provinciality being like that of a physicist who supposes that he must limit himself to frames of reference involving the earth or the sun. For more sophisticated uses of the evaluative terms, these writers seem to say, we need to recognize a potentially more *varied* reference to people—the people including any of those “for whom” the values may be thought to arise.⁹ My blank, it will be noted, simply makes the alleged need of this “for whom” clause (for the sense that I take to be in question) a little more conspicuous.

I have been discussing a relativism that emphasizes attitudes, that being the sort that is usually held; but it is perhaps worth mentioning that relativism could be developed in other ways, and even in ways that take their point of departure from intuitionism. For suppose that a follower of G. E. Moore should come to believe, contrary to Moore himself, that ethical intuitions are attended by individual differences that cannot be altered.¹⁰ He might then wish to expand “X is good” into “X is intuited to have a non-natural value-property by —,” acknowledging that if something is good relatively to the intuitions of certain people it need not be good relatively to the intuitions of certain other people. So far as I know, however, such a form of intuitionism has never been defended. The intuitionists want to escape relativism; so they render the blank superfluous by tacitly assuming from the start that individual differences, if they

⁸Edward Westermarck, *Ethical Relativity* (New York, 1932). For further remarks on a speaker's description of his own attitudes see footnote 13 of the present paper.

⁹The “potentially more varied” reference to people is characteristic of the first part of R. B. Perry's *General Theory of Value*, where one gets the impression that “X is good” can be expanded into “X helps to bring about and satisfy the integrated interests of —.” But in later portions of the book Perry seems to change his view. He there talks as though the blank could be filled in, invariably, by a reference to *all* people. And that, by rendering the blank superfluous, denies relativism in my sense by denying that “good” is a relative term. Let me put it this way: If Perry takes *the* meaning of “X” is good” to be the same as that of “X helps to bring about and satisfy the integrated interests of all people,” then he may be called, if you like, a “relationalist” about value; but without an implicit use of a blank he is not, in my sense, a relativist. In his work (New York, 1926) compare the decidedly relativistic tone of p. 37 with the non-relativistic tone of p. 621.

¹⁰For Moore's views see *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge, England, 1903).

attend our intuitions at all, will vanish in the light of careful reflection.

In concluding this part of my paper I want to emphasize a point that I made by implication in the previous section. We must not call a theory of value "relativistic" merely because it acknowledges that our value judgments involve terms that are relative in trivial or obvious respects. Thus "X is good" is sometimes short for "X is good, comparatively speaking," which in turn can be expanded into "X is better than —." But we have here only that familiar idiom, previously illustrated for "tall" and for the second of my two uses of "sweet," that permits us to make a grammatically non-comparative adjective do the work of a comparative adjective. The example unquestionably shows that "good" can become a relative term, but it is too inconsequential to establish the "relativity of value," either in my sense or in any useful sense.

5

The aim of my paper, it will be remembered, is to contrast a relativistic theory of value with a simplified version of the view that I have worked out in my *Ethics and Language*. The latter view—that is, the simplified version, which can conveniently be referred to as "the so-called non-cognitive view"—is easily summarized:

It maintains that although a speaker normally uses "X is yellow" to express his belief about X, he normally uses "X is good" to express something else, namely his approval of X. It adds that "good," being a term of praise, usually commends X to others, and thus tends to evoke their approval as well. And it makes similar remarks, *mutatis mutandis*, about "right," "duty," and so on.

No one, I suppose, continues to hold this view just as it stands. It was once defended (if not in exactly the above form, then at least in a similar form) by Russell, Carnap, Ayer, and myself;¹¹ but the need of qualifying it—and always in a direction that takes account of the flexibilities of our language—has since been evident. My *Ethics and Language* made a beginning of these qualifications by introducing a "second pattern of analysis"; and since the war a number of

¹¹See Bertrand Russell, *Religion and Science* (New York, 1935) Chap. XI; Rudolph Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (London, 1935), pp. 22-26; A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, (London, 1947) Chap. VI; and C. L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," *Mind*, XLVI, N.S. No. 181, 1937.

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writers, notably Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson,¹² have felt the need of further qualifications, some of which I am prepared to accept. It remains the case, however, that the unqualified view has left its imprint on the views that have followed it. Although it has been shown to bear on our discourse only partially, and in ways that are unexpectedly complex, it has not been qualified out of existence. So in spite of its artificial simplicity I want to give it renewed attention.

The view can be contrasted with relativism in a perfectly obvious respect. It does *not* say that the evaluative terms are relative terms, and accordingly it does *not*, in relativistic fashion, expand "This is good" into "This is approved by ———." For note that the expansion maintains by implication that a speaker typically makes a value judgment in the course of expressing his belief. The belief is *about* an attitude, to be sure, and for different ways of filling in the blank will be about the attitude of different people; but it is nevertheless a belief. And the expression of a belief is precisely what the so-called non-cognitive theory is rejecting. It holds that a speaker typically makes a value judgment in the course of expressing his *attitude*—his judgment and his attitude being related directly, without the mediation of a belief.¹³

¹²See *The Language of Morals*, by R. M. Hare (Oxford, 1952); *Ethics*, by P. H. Nowell-Smith (London, 1954); and "On Grading," by J. O. Urmson, *Mind*, LIX, No. 234, 1950.

¹³It will be asked, perhaps, whether the so-called non-cognitive theory objects to relativism even when the blank is filled in by a term referring to the speaker himself—*i.e.*, even when "This is good" is taken to have the meaning of "This is approved by me." The answer must be in the affirmative so long as "This is approved by me" merely expresses the speaker's belief about his approval, and is thus used introspectively. For to introspect an attitude is not to express it. But the answer must be in the negative, of course, so long as "This is approved by me" is taken, as the idioms of our language readily permit, to lose its introspective function and to serve the purpose of giving direct expression to an attitude. It should be noted, however, that the so-called non-cognitive theory continues to stand apart from relativism. Relativism invariably emphasizes the introspective use of "approved by me" that the so-called noncognitive theory declares irrelevant to the theory of value; for only that use is symmetrical with relativism's general insistence that value judgments, like statements in the social sciences and psychology, express empirically testable *beliefs about attitudes*.

The definition, "'X is good' means the same as 'X is approved by me,'" requires special attention in another respect: when it purports to reveal the typically evaluative meaning of "X is good" it takes that expression, in spite of the absence of a relativistic expansion, to refer to the approval of different

That there is a distinction between the two views, then, is indisputable. But it may at first seem that the distinction depends on a technicality. It may seem that the so-called non-cognitive view is *almost* a form of relativism, departing from it only in ways that make no practical difference. And I must now show that that is far from being true.

In the first place, the so-called non-cognitive view helps us to see that our every-day issues about value are usually genuine, and are not likely (apart from possible confusions to which all discourse is heir) to turn out to be pseudo-issues.

Relativism can bring with it no such assurance. For—in the form that emphasizes beliefs about attitudes, and the only form I am discussing—relativism is content to purchase its scientific affiliations at a curious price. It provides a scientific solution to those issues in which all parties are talking about the same attitudes, but it leaves us with the disturbing suggestion that many cases will not be of that sort. When Mr. A, for instance, says that socialized medicine is good and Mr. B says that it is bad, there may be only a pseudo-issue—one in which Mr. A is affirming that certain people approve of socialized medicine and Mr. B is affirming that certain *other* people disapprove of it. Neither need be mistaken in that case; and their discussion may continue only because they are confused by their relative terms, each failing to see whose attitudes the other is talking about.

The so-called non-cognitive view, on the other hand, can easily avoid this paradoxical implication. It can do so simply because it points out that Mr. A and Mr. B, in an example like the above, are respectively praising and disparaging the same thing. It thus represents their

people at different times; for the expression will refer to the approval of the *speaker*, who will not, of course, be always the same person. I hesitate to say, on that account, that the definition takes "good" to be a relative term; for we have here a shift in its reference, dependent on the circumstances of utterance, that is much more systematic than that of the other relative terms that I have illustrated, and one that parallels *any* use of a "token-reflexive" word; so perhaps my definitions of "relative term" and "relativism" could rule out shifts of this sort. But for the moment I need not decide this, since the shift in reference, so far as the theory of value is concerned, raises analytic issues that are *like* those that relativism raises. For present purposes, then, the definition in question can be treated as if it read, "'X is good' can be expanded into 'X is approved by Mr. —,'" but with the added proviso that the blank must always be filled in by the proper name (rather than by a pronoun) of the person who utters "X is good."

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issue as a disagreement in attitude—one in which the men initially express opposed attitudes rather than opposed beliefs and thus prepare the way for a discussion in which one or the other of their attitudes may come to be altered or redirected. Such an issue is far from any that can be called "pseudo" or "verbal." It is not a purely scientific issue, but it is nevertheless a genuine issue, and of a sort whose importance is beyond question.

So much, then, for the first difference between views. And beyond this there is a second difference, which I consider to be of even greater importance. It is concerned with the *reasons* by which value judgments can be supported; and I can best introduce it in the following way:

When a man expresses a belief—any belief, and hence, *a fortiori*, any belief about attitudes—his reasons for what he says are intended, of course, to support this belief, showing that it is well grounded, rather than capricious or arbitrary. His reasons are accordingly "reasons for believing," as studied in inductive and deductive logic. Relativism implies that the theory of value need recognize no other reasons than these. But what happens when a man expresses his approval of something? In that case his reasons for what he says are intended to support his approval, showing that *it* is well grounded rather than capricious or arbitrary. His reasons are accordingly "reasons for approving." And the interest of the so-called non-cognitive view, I wish to suggest, lies in showing that the theory of value makes very little sense unless it provides for these latter reasons.

Consider once again, for instance, Mr. A's favorable evaluation of socialized medicine. According to relativism, his reasons attempt to show that socialized medicine is approved by ———, and are thus reasons for *believing* that it is so approved. For most ways of filling in the blank, then, Mr. A can draw his reasons entirely from that small part of psychology or social science that deals with *de facto* approvals. Other reasons, I must acknowledge, may sometimes be relevant, and will become particularly relevant in cases where Mr. A happens to be referring, say, to the approval of some hypothetical person who knows all the consequences of socialized medicine. But relativism puts no special emphasis on such references. Value judgments remain value judgments, it implies, and can be fully supported by reasons, even when they describe the approval of those who are factually uninformed.

For the so-called non-cognitive view, on the contrary, Mr. A's reasons will be reasons *for approving* of socialized medicine. So we may

expect him to speak of the probable effects of socialized medicine on the improvement of public health, for instance, and to add that it frees the poorer classes from worry, that it is less expensive to taxpayers than one may initially suppose, that it doesn't appreciably diminish the number of qualified applicants to medical schools, that its administrative problems are easily solved, and so on. I cannot undertake to say, of course, whether or not these reasons are all of them true; but it will be evident that they are reasons that we shall want to take seriously, and are not, like those emphasized by relativism, of the comparatively trivial sort that are used in the course of describing, rather than guiding, approval.

There is nothing new, of course, in the conception of reasons for approving, which simply remind us that the head and the heart can work together. Nor is there anything new in the so-called non-cognitive theory's conception of the *modus operandi* of these reasons. They support an approval by reinforcing it, or in other words, by showing or attempting to show that the object of approval is connected with other objects of approval—the reasons, then, serving as intermediaries that are intended to permit various attitudes to act together. In speaking of the consequences of socialized medicine on the public health, for instance, Mr. A does so on the assumption that these consequences, being themselves approved, will by a familiar psychological principle serve to strengthen an approval of what is taken to be their cause.

What *is* new in the so-called non-cognitive theory, however, is its manner of making intelligible the relation between these reasons and the judgment that they support. By taking a (favorable) judgment to express approval, it shows why the *approval* needs to be guided by reasons. Whereas relativism, together with many other views, by taking the judgment to express a *belief about* approval, leads us to suppose that this belief, and only this belief, needs to be guided by reasons.

A moment's thought will show that reasons for approving are extraordinarily complicated. They are as complicated as the causal milieu in which any evaluated object invariably stands. They are of such variety that they fall within *all* the sciences, and thus draw not from some specialized part of what we know or think we know, but draw from the whole of it. They provide the so-called non-cognitive view with a cognitive richness that is virtually unlimited. It is of the utmost importance, then, to keep them from being confused with those far simpler reasons—reasons showing that people in fact approve of such and such things—that relativism is content to emphasize.

My case, however, is by no means complete. I must take further steps in showing that the methodological aspects of the so-called non-cognitive view are its strength. For they may seem, in spite of what I have been saying, to be its weakness. Although they unquestionably run contrary to the relativism that I have been discussing, they may seem to do so only by introducing another and neighboring sort of relativism, and one that is equally open to objections. I think that I can fully disprove this, showing that the neighboring relativism, too, is foreign to the so-called non-cognitive view; but I want to discuss the topic as clearly as I can, since (as I remarked at the beginning of my paper) it has often been a source of misconceptions.

To understand the point in question we must remember that the so-called non-cognitive view recognizes the possibility of giving factual reasons for evaluative conclusions. My example about socialized medicine repeatedly illustrated these reasons, and will be sufficient to show that there is nothing unusual about them. But they can not, of course, be judged by the rules of deductive or inductive logic. That is precluded by the very notion of reasons for approving, which fall outside logic simply because they require inferences (if I may call them that) from belief-expressing to attitude-expressing sentences. The truth of the reasons themselves can be tested by logic; but their bearing on the evaluative conclusion is neither logical nor illogical. It is simply non-logical.

The so-called non-cognitive view must accordingly deal with the following question: "When reasons are non-logical, on what grounds, if any, are we to accept certain reasons and reject others?" And of course the view cannot in sanity maintain that there are no grounds whatsoever. All of us, in common-sense discussions, accept certain reasons as *justifying* an evaluative conclusion and reject certain others as *failing to justify* such a conclusion. Consider, for instance, the following example:

A certain state is considering the possibility of introducing a sharply progressive income tax. Mr. Pro claims that the tax would be highly desirable, and gives as his reason, "It would for the most part tax the rich, and thus put less burden on the poor." Mr. Con acknowledges that the tax would indeed have that effect, but adds that no such consideration can justify Mr. Pro's favorable judgment. "Actually," he says in reply, "your reason justifies an *unfavorable* judgment of the tax, since the rich are already heavily burdened. . . ." And so on.

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Note that Mr. Con in rejecting Mr. Pro's reason not because he considers it false, but because it fails, he maintains, to justify the conclusion that it is alleged to justify. And regardless of whether Mr. Con is right or wrong in this contention, his remark unquestionably makes good sense. No theorist, whether he is a so-called non-cognitivist or something else, could be content to hold that "justify" has no meaning in such a context.

Now it is precisely here that the so-called non-cognitive view, in spite of its sharp break with relativism with regard to the meaning of "good," "right," and so on, seems to lead back to relativism by another route. For in providing a non-logical sense of "justify," and one that allows for individual differences in the way that reasons guide approval, it seems to have no better alternative than to consider "justify" a relative term. It seems committed, accordingly, to what may be called a "methodological relativism," or in other words, to a theory that defends some such principle as this: to say that a factual reason, R, justifies the evaluation, E, is to say that a belief of R will in fact cause people of sort — to be more inclined to accept E.

The objections to methodological relativism are much the same, let me remark, as they are for any other sort of relativism with regard to values. There will again be the possibility of pseudo-issues; for when Mr. Pro says that a certain R justifies a certain E, and Mr. Con denies this, they may neither of them be mistaken, and think they are disagreeing only because they are confused by their relative term. And even in cases where the issue is genuine, the evidence showing that R justifies E will usually involve no more than a psychological or sociological inquiry into the considerations by which such and such people are influenced. So although methodological relativism stays off stage, as it were, it nevertheless continues to direct the actors.

But I have been speaking, it will be remembered, about what may easily *seem* to be the case. I must now make good my claim that it is not in fact the case.

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Since the question requires me to explain what "justify" means, I can best proceed by considering what sort of problem the word is expected to handle. Suppose, then, that we should attempt to correlate each of a certain set of value judgments with its justifying reasons—taking care to include only the reasons that really justify the judgments, and giving warnings about those that, though sometimes forensically effective, really do not justify the judgments. What would we

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be doing? Would we be developing only the prolegomena to an evaluative inquiry? Or would we be in the midst of an inquiry that was itself evaluative?

It is tempting to favor the first of these alternatives. "A study of justifying reasons," we are likely to say, "is useful because it permits us to take a non-evaluative first step toward deciding what is right or good—a step that gives us a methodology, with rules for making trustworthy inferences. We can then go on, subsequently, to a second step, where by applying our methodology we can draw our evaluative conclusions with greater security."

But such an answer, as I see it, is entirely incorrect. I suspect that its alleged two steps are two only in appearance, the former being no more than a mirror image of the latter. Or to speak more literally, I suspect that any inquiry of the sort now in question—any attempt to find the factual reasons by which a value judgment can be justified—is itself an evaluative inquiry, and indeed, one that if fully developed would require us to take a stand on each and every evaluative issue that could ever confront us. I have been led to this conclusion by studying examples, of which the following are typical:

Suppose that a theorist should say, "Given any specific judgment of the form, *X is good*, there is one and only one sort of reason that is sufficient to justify it, and that is a reason of the form, *X leads to the general happiness*." Is his claim one that stands a little apart from normative ethics, being concerned only with its methodology, or is it an ordinary ethical claim?

I think there can be no doubt about the matter. Our theorist is more than a methodologist with Utilitarian propensities. He simply is a Utilitarian. His terms "reason" and "justify" must not lead us to suppose that he is making a neutral, methodological claim that is separable from Utilitarianism. For how can he hold that *X leads to the general happiness* is the only reason sufficient to justify the conclusion, *X is good*, without holding that anything is good if and only if it leads to the general happiness?

My example is perhaps too general, however, to be wholly instructive, so let me turn to several that are more specific. Suppose that Mr. Asothersdo has accepted a bribe but claims that he has done nothing wrong, since many of his associates did the same thing. Most of us would deny, of course, that his reason does anything at all toward justifying his judgment, whether in this special case or in any similar case. And as I see it, our denial amounts to our saying this: "Your accepting a bribe is no less wrong when others are doing it than

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when others aren't doing it." Thus what seems to be our objection to Mr. Asothersdo's logic, in some extended sense of that term, is in practice wholly indistinguishable from an ordinary ethical judgment.

Interesting cases arise when reasons are taken to strengthen a man's position without fully establishing it. Thus Mr. Lowscale says that one of his friends is industrious, and therefore a good man. We shall presumably wish to reply that his reason is not *sufficient* to justify his conclusion—thus refusing to make the judgment, "He is good if industrious, regardless of his other qualities." But we shall presumably add that his reason acts as a vectorial force, as it were, in helping to justify his conclusion—thus, in effect, making the judgment, "Industriousness is a virtue, but a good man must have other virtues as well." So both aspects of our remark about a justifying reason again raise issues that are straightforwardly evaluative.

I could multiply examples endlessly, but shall be content to give only one more. Suppose that Mr. Pacifist says, "It is our duty to avoid a war even at the cost of losing our freedom," and gives as his reason, "A war, in this atomic age, would destroy the lives of millions of innocent people, with devastating effects on civilization." This is an argument that most of us are not prepared to handle with the same dispatch as we handle Mr. Asothersdo's argument or Mr. Lowscale's argument. We shall some of us have to deliberate before deciding whether Mr. Pacifist's reason justifies his conclusion or whether it doesn't. And just what will we be trying to decide? Is it some pre-ethical question that bothers us, concerned only with methodology? It seems to me obvious that we are confronted, rather, with a choice between evils—evils that we hope are only hypothetical, but are not so certain to be hypothetical that we can afford to disregard them. Which would be worse: to keep peace at the expense of our freedom or to destroy the lives of millions of innocent people with devastating effects on civilization? When we ask that we are in effect asking over again whether Mr. Pacifist's reason, if true, will justify his conclusion; and the words "reason," "justify," and "conclusion" certainly cannot blind us, in any such living context, to the fact that our question is a genuinely *ethical* question.

So the general situation is this: when we claim that the factual reason, R, if true, would justify or help to justify the evaluative conclusion, E, we are in effect making another value judgment, E', of our own—the latter serving to evaluate the situation that we shall have if the facts of the case include those that R purports to describe.

Once this has been established, there is no difficulty in reading

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off its implications with regard to the topic of my paper. The so-called non-cognitive view, in its treatment of justifying reasons, is immediately freed from any suspicion of joining forces with methodological relativism. Indeed we need only review what has been said:

A methodological inquiry, when it attempts to find the R's that will justify a given E, doesn't stand apart from an evaluative inquiry but simply continues it, yielding ordinary value judgments that are expressed in a different terminology. The so-called non-cognitive view, then, which we have seen to be non-relativistic with regard to ordinary value judgments, is equally so with regard to justifications. Just as it doesn't take "good" to be a relative term, so it doesn't take "justify" to be a relative term—for the latter term does no more than extend the issues introduced by the former.

Such is the simple answer to what superficially appears to be a difficult question. But to dispel any sense of perplexity that may attend the answer, let me make the following remark:

If we approach all value judgments with an initial skepticism, supposing that we somehow "must" refuse to make them until we have given a full set of reasons that justify them, then the above reduction of "R justifies E" to the further judgment, E', will indeed perplex us. For we shall never, with this approach, be able to *get started* with our evaluations. We shall withhold judgment about E until we have found R's that justify it; but in claiming that certain R's justify it we shall, by the reduction in question, be making another judgment, E'; so we must withhold judgment about E' until we have found the R's that justify *it* . . . and so on. Our initial skepticism will never be dispelled. But that will be true, let me point out, only if we start with an initial skepticism, and indeed, with an initial skepticism that infects *all* our value judgments. And why should we start in any such manner as that? Why can't we start as we do in common life? There we have attitudes that we initially trust, and we proceed to express them. Reasons serve not to bring our attitudes into being, but only to redirect them. And if in accepting or rejecting the reasons we are making new evaluations, and thus expressing new attitudes, that is only to say that more of our attitudes, through the mediation of the reasons, are coming into play. If we initially distrust all our attitudes, in short, our reasons will not *give* us attitudes; but an initial distrust of all our attitudes is so fantastic that we need not, surely, take it seriously.

In revealing the scope and variety of justifying reasons, then, the so-called non-cognitive view implies nothing that is paradoxical.

And if it makes no attempt to say which R's will justify a given E, that is only because, having shown that such an inquiry reduplicates an evaluative inquiry, it is careful not to go beyond its limited aims. As a non-normative meta-theory of norms, its business is not to make value judgments, but only to survey and clarify them.

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I shall conclude my paper by explaining what a relativistic theory of value amounts to when seen from the so-called non-cognitivist point of view, for by doing so I can emphasize still further the basic difference between the two theories—a difference that deserves every possible emphasis.

Briefly stated, my contention is this: when seen from the point of view in question, relativism is a meta-theory that systematically forces "good" to have the meaning of "considered good," and "justifies" to have the meaning of "is considered to justify," and so on. But let me develop this in more detail.

We have seen that the so-called non-cognitive view refuses to expand "X is good" into "X is approved by ———." But it does not persist in this refusal, of course, when it deals with "X is considered good." for the word "considered" introduces indirect discourse; it yields a sentence that no longer commits the speaker to a value judgment of his own, but simply enables him to ascribe judgments to other people—namely, to the people who are alleged to do the considering. And how will the view handle a sentence of this latter sort?

In the first place, it will take the trivial step of expanding "X is considered good" into "X is considered good by ———," the object being to show, by emphasizing a relative term, that those alleged to do the considering will vary with the circumstances of utterance. (If this were the mark of relativism, by the way, then all theories would be relativistic.) In the second place, it will call attention to the similarity between "considered good by ———" and "approved by ———," a similarity arising from the fact (and for the so-called non-cognitive view it is indeed a fact) that X is considered good when and only when it is the object of an actually or potentially expressed approval. And finally, it will go on, roughly but not inacceptably, to its analytic conclusion: it will expand "X is considered good" into "X is approved by ———."

The importance of this observation is evident: it enables us to see that the so-called non-cognitive view handles "X is *considered*

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good" in the same way that relativism attempts to handle "X is good." Accordingly, the so-called non-cognitive view not only rejects relativism but also locates its error: it claims that relativism blurs the distinction between the direct discourse of "X is good" and the indirect discourse of "X is considered good," and that it thereafter proceeds to mislead us by handling the former expression as though it were the latter.

If we follow out this criticism we shall find that it is intuitively convincing. All the contentions of relativism, as soon as they are made for "considered good" rather than for "good," become plausible—but also commonplace. It is commonplace, for instance, to maintain that things are often considered good by some people and not by others. For that reminds us, at most, that evaluative problems are often controversial. And it need not even do that: it may show only that a thing is or is not considered good depending on the circumstances that attend it—X being considered good under circumstances C₁, and being considered not good circumstances C₂. The people who do the considering, in this latter case, need not be engaged in any controversy. (Cf. *supra*, p. 30.)

Similarly, it is commonplace to maintain that questions about what is considered good can be delegated to the social sciences. The word "considered" pushes *any* question in that direction; for the question then becomes one about what views are *held* by these or those people, and the social sciences can indeed test whether or not they are in fact held.

When a relativist deals with "considered good," then—and the same can be said of "considered right," "considered to be justified," and so on—he tends only to tire our patience. His view becomes surprising only when it is transferred to "good," "right," "justified," and so on; and then, according to the so-called non-cognitive view, it is entirely confused.

Indeed, the confusion is such a thorough one that it would be impossible to live by relativism. A consistent relativist, when asked what is good or right, *et cetera*, would in effect discuss only what is or was considered good or right, *et cetera*, and thus would himself stand committed to no value judgments whatsoever. He would be a non-participant on evaluative issues—as no man, in practice, can be.

But we must remember that the relativistic confusion, however curious it may seem to a so-called non-cognitivist, is nevertheless very tempting in the social sciences. A social scientist attempts to survey people's evaluations with a temporary detachment—to survey them without as yet taking sides, and thus without as yet participating in the

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normative issues that they may occasion. So *his* problem is basically different from the problem that he describes. His problem, in short, is concerned with what is *considered* good, whereas the problem that he describes is concerned with what *is* good. By an error parallel to the one that James called "the psychologist's fallacy," however, he may suppose that his problem is *not* basically different from the one that he describes. And when he yields to this tempting error he may wander from "considered good" to "good" without realizing that he is doing so.

In an important sense of words, then, the so-called non-cognitive view defends neither an ordinary relativism nor a methodological relativism. It is an answer to relativism; and it can explain, in part at least, why the errors of relativism are tempting ones.

Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact*

A. I. MELDEN

It has often been said that if there is one thing clear in moral philosophy it is that one cannot derive an *ought* from an *is*, a moral conclusion from a matter of fact. This is the lesson frequently drawn from Moore's controversial argument from trivialization in *Principia Ethica*. There, it will be recalled, Moore objected to the identification of *good* with any so-called natural property on the ground that this would entail the trivialization of a manifestly non-trivial statement. For example, if *good* were the very same quality as pleasure, then the allegedly non-trivial statement 'Pleasure is good' would then reduce to the barren triviality 'Pleasure is pleasure.' But more recent writers, rejecting both the intuitionism to which Moore was led no less than the ethical naturalism he attacked, have drawn a quite different moral. And in doing this they have been led curiously enough to revive a forgotten movement represented long ago by Hume. For according to these writers, Moore's mistake lay in supposing that because 'good' (similar applications of the argument are made for 'ought,' 'right,' and so on) is not the name of this or that ordinary property, it must therefore be the name of some *sui generis* unanalyzable property. The conclusion he should have derived, according to these same writers, is that 'good' (and so too with 'ought' and 'right') when employed in moral contexts does not describe anything either primarily or at all. Moral terms *qua* moral have a radically different function. They are employed—here we have a bewildering array of suggestions—to express feelings, emotions, or attitudes; to guide choices and action; to persuade, prescribe, or propose; to command, recommend, or commend; and so on. For moral discourse, according to this line of attack, is practical rather than theoretical; and as such it serves the heart, not the head—the concerns of an engaged agent, not the pallid interest of a spectator of fact. And since these are radically different matters, small wonder that it is impossible to derive an *ought* from an *is*, a matter of morality from a matter of fact! It would be just as absurd

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to try to derive any of the alleged non-descriptive functions of moral discourse from any neutral statement of fact as it would be to try to squeeze out humor from any page of *Principia Mathematica*. Moral discourse is uniquely different from ordinary factual discourse, not because it involves uniquely different properties, but because it does not purport to deal with fact at all. Description and moral evaluation, being radically distinct, are logically independent.

What shall we say about this type of claim? How if at all, and in what sense can an *ought* be derived from an *is*? No one would deny that there is *some* distinction between, on the one hand, moral evaluation or judgment and, on the other, factual statement and description; yet the claim that the latter, unlike the former, pertains to the domain of fact, not only seems to do violence to our common way of speaking, it also appears to bring into question our familiar inferences from matters of fact to the moral conclusions that these seem to justify. For it is a fact that So-and-so is my father and therefore has certain rights and privileges; that I have promised and thereby am under an obligation; that So-and-so is generous and thereby is commendable;—the instances can be multiplied endlessly. But if 'matters of morality' and 'matters of fact' apply to such dissimilar domains of experience, each of these inferences, as stated, must be brought into question, or at the very least stands in need of drastic reformulation. We are familiar with the challenging query, 'How can reason be practical?' Should we not also face up to its counterpart—those of us at any rate who deny that *ought* can be derived from an *is*—"How can practice be reasonable?" For the practices of human beings may be right or wrong no less than fortunate or unfortunate. If right, they are surely reasonable; and, if so, often at least, reasons for them can be given that establish that they are reasonable and right. But anything that is a reason must surely refer us to some factual matter. How else could one challenge the reasons given for an action not only on the ground that they are insufficient or even beside the point, but also, as it happens on occasion, because they do not agree with or correctly represent the facts in the case? I should have no good reasons for doing x any more than I should have good reasons for believing p if what I present as reasons—whether for doing or for believing—turned out to be false. And since a reason for doing, which establishes that the doing in question is right, justifies it, does it not follow from the facts presented by good enough reasons and true, that the action is right? In brief, is it not true that the very notion of a reason for doing *requires* that an *ought* or some other matter of

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morality be derivable from an *is*? The proper question, it would appear, is not 'Is an *ought* derivable from an *is*?'—for it must be if we are to make sense of the very notion of a moral reason for doing, a consideration that morally justifies one's doing—but rather 'How or in what sense are we to construe the derivability of an *ought* from an *is*?'

But this, it will be objected, is much too fast, much too good to be true. No doubt a reason that does indeed justify a moral conclusion, one that is good and sufficient, must agree with the facts; but from this it does not follow that in advancing a reason one is simply advancing a truth-claim. If this were the case every reason for doing would be sustained, not subverted as in fact it is, by a 'Yes, so what?'; for the appropriate response to good and sufficient reasons for doing is doing, and no mere passive assent of the intellect. If, therefore, reasons can be challenged on the ground that they do not agree with the facts, this is not because they merely, but only because they do more than, state facts, describe states of affairs, or convey information. Insofar as they *merely* state facts, describe states of affairs, or convey information, no matter of morality follows because, so far, they are not reasons for doing anything at all. It is only insofar as they do something other, and indeed more than, state facts, describe states of affairs, or convey information, that they are the reasons they are. Such, I believe, would be the reply.

Now no one would doubt that there is some distinction between reasons for belief and reasons for action—these expressions are not synonyms—and I should be the last to do so. What I want to examine is the idea that only by doing something other than saying what is the case, do we offer reasons for doing, considerations that justify an *ought*. Here it seems to me is one of the most decisively unfortunate moves in recent moral philosophy. What in effect we are offered is a dichotomy between truth-claims and moral reasons. Insofar as we have a truth-claim, we have no moral reason for doing anything at all. Insofar as we have a moral reason for doing, we have something other or more than a truth-claim. If therefore our reasons for doing are challenged other or more than a truth-claim. If therefore our reasons for doing are challenged on the ground that they do not agree with the facts, the items challenged are blends or mixtures of truth-claims and something else that makes them the moral reasons they are.

But what is that ingredient—that something else—that makes them the moral reasons they are? It would be too lengthy a job to examine here and now every one of the many items that have been suggested;

and, fortunately, it is unnecessary to do so. For all are subject to one fatal obligation, namely, that to the extent to which, if at all, the suggested item provides any warrant for a moral conclusion, it refers us to a relevant matter of fact—a morally relevant fact—and *only as such*, and *not* as anything else, does it provide any support for any moral conclusion.

The point can be illustrated by reference to Stevenson's suggested pattern of analysis for normative statements of the form 'x is good,' namely, 'I like x, do so as well' where 'I like it' purports to describe some psychological occurrence and, allegedly, is devoid of the normative import supplied by the 'do so as well.' We are told that the first clause simply describes, that the latter invites, suggests, or solicits, and, that insofar as it does so it provides the 'dynamic' or 'magnetic' feature that characterizes practical discourse. Now just what it means to invite or solicit a liking, I do not understand at all. But presumably the force of the clause 'do so as well' is somehow to produce in the mind of the listener that occurrence described by 'I like. . . .' Just what sort of occurrence this can be is certainly unclear. In any case, and this is the point I wish to stress, however effective a solicitation or suggestion may be, it surely provides no reason for any ensuing doing; otherwise moralists, propagandists, and streetwalkers alike, and with equal justice, might claim that they are engaged in rational persuasion. A suggestion or solicitation may be effective in causing someone to do or to abstain from doing; but causing someone to do is not the same thing as giving him any cause for what he does. Nor is it true that 'I like x' is even used to describe one's feelings or state of mind or some mental occurrence. It *may be* employed in order to inform. And the verb 'to like' may also be used in order to request or order as it would be in the case in which I tell the waiter that I would like coffee. But it is also used not uncommonly to express one's considered opinion. 'I like that man' uttered in many a familiar context expresses one's judgment of the qualities of the person to whom one is referring. In such cases it is presented as the considered judgment of a responsible critic, not as an utterance which might have been made by a child, except of course in situations of make-believe in which a child play-acts the role of an adult. Still less is 'I like that man' to be construed as giving information about one's feelings or state of mind; it would be narcissism at its worst to employ such first-person utterances only in order to reveal something about oneself. If this is true, Stevenson's contention that the normative feature of 'I like x, do so as well' is provided by the second clause is doubly mistaken. Solicitation or

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suggestion or persuasion, however, effective it may be, in itself does not and cannot conceivably provide any warrant for or justification of its own merits—if it did, *vide* Moore, it could not be subject to any evaluation at all. And if there is anything normative about 'I like x, do so as well,' it derives from the 'I like x' uttered by someone in a position to express his considered and reliable opinion —of what?—surely of the merit of x. 'I like x' uttered in this way is in fact a special way of saying that x is good. And for those of us to whom it is addressed it does provide a reason for, some justification of, the view that the object in question is good, not because, in general, the fact that 'A says p renders p probable or likely,' but because uttered in this special way, 'I like x' expresses the verdict of someone reliable in his estimation of relevant fact and hence more likely than many another person to be correct in his evaluation, in his judgment that x is good. Hence it is not insofar as 'I like x, do so as well' involves some so-called non-descriptive feature of discourse that it has any normative import, but only because and just to the extent that there is the matter of fact circumstance that it is employed by someone reliable and responsible in expressing his estimation of the merit of the object. And it is this factual matter which remains with undiminished force as the warranting consideration it is for those of us to whom it is addressed even when it is explicitly noted, described, or referred to in discourse that is admittedly fact-stating, that says what is the case. It is surely false that it is a warranting consideration only because it is *merely* understood or suggested or insinuated or implied by the speaker or only because it causes anyone to do anything about it. Rather, it is a warranting consideration because it is the factual consideration it is, however it may be that it is brought to the attention of those who understand the words we employ and whatever the effect, if any, its recognition has upon their conduct. Hence, insofar as we state this sort of consideration, we offer reasons and what we offer as reasons are matters of fact, not a blend of matters of fact and something else, namely, persuasion, solicitation, or suggestion.

It will not do at all to reply that the alleged matter of fact, namely, the ascription of merit to the object by a responsible and reliable person is itself in need of the sort of analysis proposed by Stevenson. For this reply leads nowhere except to a tiresome repetition of my argument. But, to cut short all such defenses, I need only ask what is the fact that enjoys pure factuality and that is involved in the claim that the object has merit—a merit of which a responsible and reliable critic can take due account? What is the alleged descriptive com-

ponent of the statement that a responsible and reliable person is ascribing merit to the object? Is it that the person in question likes the object? Surely this is irrelevant as it stands—it invites a ‘So what?’—unless we have reason to admire or respect his taste in the matter. And if we do, it is not that any Tom, Dick, or Harry likes the object that provides any warrant for supposing it to have merit, but that someone with acknowledged good taste likes it, that is, someone likely to take due and proper account of the merit of the object. In short, the contention that in saying that someone recognizes that an object has merit one is offering a blend of two things—persuasion mixed with truth-claim—this contention invites the retort ‘What truth-claim?’ For it is this, not the persuasion, that must account for the normative feature of his claim. And nothing less than a truth-claim that shows that the object has or is likely to have merit will do. Alternatively, if the fact that his claim is persuasive has the least tendency to support the claim that the object has merit, it cannot be that any Tom, Dick, or Harry is being persuaded or is likely to be persuaded, but that the claim persuades those of us who are concerned with the question of merit and who have been led to agree on the basis of a relevant fact, namely, his authority. In either case it is because the utterance purports to present some matter of fact that accounts for its normative feature—it is not persuasion as such, but the representation that there are facts that establish the persuasion as rational, that does the trick. It is impossible to transform a sow’s ear into a silk purse; and it is impossible to transform non-normative into normative utterances, or something that in itself is not a reason into something that is a reason, by adding a dash of persuasion or suggestion.

The point I have made in these remarks about Stevenson’s suggested pattern of analysis is that a consideration provides a warrant for an evaluative conclusion not because it does something more than refer us to a matter of fact, but only because, and just to the extent that it does so. The same point can be illustrated too, in connection with the well-advertised move that saying that something is good is not saying what is true about it (this, I suppose, is what is intended by the remark that one is not describing something in saying that it is good) but doing something else, namely, commending it. No doubt if, honestly, I commend something or someone, I do so because I consider that thing or person in some relevant way or sense good, that is, worthy of commendation. But the converse is surely false, for I am in no position to commend many of the things

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or persons I consider good or worthy of commendation. A commanding officer may commend his troops for their valor. I as civilian spectator cannot do so, however much I agree that they are worthy of commendation, not because commending is much too difficult a feat for me to perform, but because, not being in a position of authority with respect to these men, all talk of my commending them is as much out of place as any talk of my commanding them. That is to say, it would not be false but absurd for me to say to them 'I commend you for your valor,' just as it would be absurd for me to say, 'I command you to. . . .' But suppose that I am in a position to commend (or to command). Then the fact that I commend (or command) does provide a reason for believing that there is merit in the thing or person commended (or any merit in doing the action commanded). But it provides such a reason not because persons were being influenced in their attitudes or actions, but because of the matter of fact authority which I have in the matter. For if my commanding (or commanding) does provide a warrant, a reason, for thinking that the thing commended (or commanded) is worth-while, it does so precisely because and just to the extent that a person enjoying this authority is likely to act as he does out of regard for the merit of the thing or person (or action) and because, more often than many another person similarly concerned but devoid of this authority, he is likely to be correct in his judgment. If, then, commending provides any warrant for ascribing merit, it does so not because it is a doing rather than a saying what is the case, but only because it is the doing of one who knows what he is up to and is in a better position than others to take due and proper account of relevant fact. It is therefore insofar as, and just to the extent that, commending points to such matters of fact, not because it is a doing rather than a saying what is true (and so, too, with commanding), that it provides any reason for the evaluation.

So it is with moral reasons for doing, reasons that support the claim that a given action is morally required or obligatory. These are reasons, not because they involve some so-called non-descriptive component, but just to the extent that they refer us to some storable and relevant matter of fact; for this, and only this, provides a warrant for the moral conclusion drawn.

So it is too with recent attempts, notably by Hare, to apply the imperative model to moral and indeed to all practical discourse. Here I shall not be concerned with the fact that strictly speaking an imperative when employed correctly involves some sort of authority

of the person issuing it and hence that in so far as it provides any reason for doing it does so because of a matter of fact: the authority of the speaker, his special status with respect to the person to whom the imperative is directed. For the term 'imperative' has been employed with inexcusable looseness by a number of recent writers as a blanket term covering demands, proposals, expressions of resolution, promises, or any other form of discourse the appropriate response to which either by the speaker or by anyone else is an action—hence the defensive terms 'quasi-imperative' and 'imperative force' which are applied by these writers to any form of practical discourse whether or not it is in the imperative mood provided that some action is thought to be relevant or appropriate to it in some sense or other. But setting aside all of this enveloping obscurity, what I wish to consider is the character of the contrast drawn by these writers between practical discourse as 'prescriptive' or 'imperative,' that is, discourse that serves to guide choices and conduct, and discourse that is 'factual' or 'descriptive.' For it is this contrast that is disastrous to the very notion of a reason for doing, namely, a reason that provides no mere explanation but a warrant for or justification of conduct.

We are told by Hare, for one, that the trouble with ethical naturalism so-called is that it mistakenly identifies the relation that holds between good-making characteristics and *good* (so too, I suppose, with right-making characteristics and *right* and also with ought-making characteristics and *ought*) with the relation of logical implication or entailment. For it is impossible to deduce judgments of value (or of morality) from mere statements of fact. Why? Well, judgments of value (and of morality) are employed to guide choices and conduct and therefore are prescriptive or imperative rather than descriptive of what is the case. Now nothing can be deduced from any set of premises unless at least implicitly it is somehow contained in them. In particular, no imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises unless these involve covertly, implicitly, or explicitly at least one imperative. Since judgments of value (and of morality) are imperatives, it follows that no judgment of value (or of morality) is logically implied by any set of purely descriptive premises, even those that refer explicitly to good-making (and right-making and also ought-making) characteristics. In brief, ethical naturalism attempts to derive an *ought* from an *is*. And this, according to Hare and his followers, involves a breach of a fundamental logical rule that prohibits an inference from pure indicatives to any imperative.

Now just what is meant by the dictum that the conclusion of a

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valid argument is at least implicitly contained in the premises is obscure to say the least unless it is the disguised tautology that the conclusion of a valid argument is logically implied or entailed by the premises. But also obscure is the corollary of this so-called logical rule, namely, that no imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of pure indicatives, that a value judgment, being an imperative, cannot be deduced from purely factual or descriptive statements. Consider the case in which I ask myself whether or not I should purchase these strawberries. Now there would be good reasons for my purchasing them if and only if there were good reasons for believing that I should purchase them. That is to say, instead of speaking about good reasons for doing *x* we can speak, equivalently, about good reasons for believing that *x* should be done. Now by any ordinary standards of good sense in the matter, the fact that these strawberries are red, juicy, large, meaty, and inexpensive is a good reason, a very good one indeed, for my purchasing them—equivalently, for believing that I should purchase them. For I should purchase them if they are good ones and inexpensive, and the fact that they are red, juicy, large, meaty is good reason, very good reason it would seem, for considering them good. But if Hare is correct, no reason for purchasing the strawberries—equivalently, no reason for thinking that they should be purchased is afforded by the mere fact that they are inexpensive, red, large, juicy, *et cetera*. And suppose that I went on to examine them and determined further that they were full of vitamins, easily digestible, and highly nutritious, indeed that there was no good reason *against* my purchasing them—for concluding that I ought *not* to purchase them—(as indeed there would be if it turned out that I was allergic to strawberries, sick and tired of their taste, had no money, or . . .) then on Hare's principles I should still have absolutely no reason to purchase them, no reason for concluding that I should purchase them. Surely this seems to verge on madness. Surely the fact that the strawberries are of the kind mentioned above provides excellent reason for purchasing them. And if I am assured that there is no good reason why I should *not* purchase them, do I not then have good and sufficient reasons for purchasing them? And does it not then *follow* from these considerations that I should purchase them? What further matter needs to be injected here in order to insure the correctness of the transition from factual considerations to action, from factual considerations to evaluative conclusion?

It will not do to reply that the alleged fact that there are excellent

reasons for purchasing the strawberries and no good reason against purchasing them is itself a normative matter. For this invites a similar attack: my reason for saying that there is no good reason against my purchasing them is that I have found no such consideration as that, for example, I have no money, I am allergic to them, and so forth. That there are no such matter of fact considerations is precisely the reason for my saying that there is no good reason against my purchasing the strawberries. Further, the fact that the strawberries are sweet and meaty *must* be a good reason for purchasing them since if in addition to this it is also true that there are no reasons against my purchasing them, it then *follows* that I should purchase them. The not unexpected reply to this is as follows: Saying that the strawberries are red, juicy, nutritious, sweet, meaty, *et cetera*, is so far offering reasons for purchasing them, for concluding that they are worthy of being purchased and that I should purchase them, only if these allegedly descriptive terms—'red', 'juicy', 'nutritious', *et cetera*,—are covertly evaluative. But, 'covert' conveys the idea of something concealed or disguised. And what is concealed or disguised can be brought into full view or fully exposed. Then let us use terms which enable us to disentangle the descriptions so-called from the evaluation and which together with the latter give us just that force of the statement 'These strawberries are red, sweet, juicy, *et cetera*,' which it has as a reason for purchasing them, for concluding that they are good and should be purchased. And if this cannot be done the familiar defence that these terms are 'covertly' evaluative is no defence at all but only a rhetorical flourish useful only in order to conceal from oneself that evaluations do follow from descriptions, that matters of fact *as* matters of fact can and do constitute good reasons for doing, reasons for concluding that doings should be performed.

It should be noted as a fact of some interest that attention has been devoted almost exclusively to the so-called evaluative component of the alleged blends of description and evaluation. What the purely descriptive components of meaning involved in 'sweet,' 'juicy,' and the like, are, we are not told. Presumably, whatever they are they must be value-free in some sense. They are the so-called criteria for the application of value terms, which as criteria are to be distinguished from the meaning of these terms. That is to say, they carry no logical implication of worth or desirability nor are they logically implicated in any of the evaluative terms we might choose to employ. Accordingly, it would appear to be quite possible for someone to understand the meaning of the expression 'good strawberry' without understanding

what kind of thing one might apply it to, just as it would appear to be quite possible for someone to apply purely descriptive terms so-called to strawberries without ever understanding that in doing so he was ever offering any good reasons for applying evaluative terms as well. Now what would count as a purely descriptive term, which would satisfy these requirements, except one purchased at the cost of utter irrelevancy I confess I am unable to say. Certainly no term ordinarily labelled 'descriptive' could possibly satisfy these conditions of radical astringency. If we substitute talk about glucose or sucrose for sweet, talk about wave lengths for red, and so on, no doubt we can purchase complete immunity from evaluation. But are we then still talking about the same thing, the color and the taste which as such, and not as anything else, provide us with our familiar warrants for evaluation and action?

But let us suppose that this unblemished purity of description *can* be purchased without changing the subject, that this can be done by substituting certain adjectives 'x', 'y', and 'z' for 'red', 'sweet', and 'large.' How shall we exhibit the evaluative component of meaning that it is somehow conveyed by the employment of our more prosaic terms? Here at any rate the answer is forthright: The conclusion that our strawberries are worthy of purchase can be rendered as an imperative that the strawberries are to be purchased. That the strawberries are sweet, red, and large would justify us in purchasing them, that is, in acting on this imperative if and only if this imperative were deducible from it. Now an imperative cannot be deduced from pure indicatives alone. Hence, 'The strawberries are sweet, red, and large' involves, in addition to the purely descriptive component of meaning, namely, 'The strawberries are of the kind x, y, and z,' some imperative—a general imperative—to which assent is given by anyone who regards the so-called fact that they are sweet, red, and large as a reason for purchasing them. It is this general imperative, then, to the effect that any strawberries of the kind x, y, and z are to be purchased that is the evaluative component of meaning of 'These strawberries are sweet, red, and large' in so far as the utterance has any role in justifying the purchase. For it is this imperative together with the purely descriptive proposition that the strawberries are of the kind x, y, and z from which the imperative conclusion that the strawberries should be purchased can be deduced. Such, in brief, is the view.

Here I shall not comment upon the irrationality of the general imperative—should I purchase strawberries of the kind x, y, and z, whenever they are available and no matter what my circumstances

may be (*vide* Anscombe's discussion in *Intention*)—but on the equally telling point: Why should I accept, assent, or commit myself to this or to any imperative? As strawberries of the kind *x*, *y*, and *z* (remember that these terms are allegedly pure and wholly neutral descriptive terms) there is nothing, so far, worth my bothering about them. Why, therefore, get into any precipitate state of mind about them; why put myself on the ready to do anything about strawberries of this kind, this being the sort of thing in which assenting to the general imperative consists? For the point of the expression 'assenting to an imperative' is not to direct our thought to the idea that the imperative is reasonable, but to guarantee, when the expression is correctly applied, that the individual will, if sincere, go on to act in the manner described. That is to say, the fact that a person 'assents' to an imperative is the reason he acts as he does where, however, the reason simply explains but in no way involves a reason he might give, that is, a justification, for acting as he does. In this sense of 'reason' the reason Jones acts as he does may well be that he is a boor, but this can scarcely be his reason—any justification he might offer—for acting as he does. No doubt someone may act as he does because he has been itching to do so, or because he has been waiting, all ready, to do so, or because, if you wish, he has 'assented' to an imperative. But why do this? And unless good reasons can be given for assenting to our general imperative about the strawberries of the kind *x*, *y*, and *z*, citing the fact that one is in general on the ready to purchase strawberries of this kind, together with the fact that these strawberries are of this general sort, so far this may explain how it has happened that one made the purchase, but this has not the least tendency to show that the purchase one made was reasonable or justified. I would show, in other words, what caused the person to act as he did, but in no way would it show that the person had any cause for acting as he did. The point easily overlooked is that an imperative, whether it be a general or specific, (and here it makes no matter that the term is employed strictly or loosely to cover proposals, expressions of resolutions, promises, assurances, and the like) is in principle subject to rational or critical appraisal. This, I suppose, is precisely the analogue of the point made by Moore in his criticism of certain so-called naturalistic doctrines. Hence stating the imperative on which one has acted is so far not to give any reason that justifies one's action. But how can one justify an imperative? Surely, citing another imperative only postpones the issue. Nothing less than a matter of fact will do. Thus if I should 'assent' to an imperative to purchase strawberries of the kind *x*, *y*, and

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z, there must be something true about this kind of strawberry that justifies me in the assent I give. But if this is so then it is this fact—a fact about strawberries of the kind x, y, and z,—not the ‘assent’ to the imperative that justifies me in my action. That is to say, only a matter of fact about the strawberries before me, not any disposition or readiness to act, justifies my purchasing them, provides me with a good reason for doing so, or equivalently, provides me with a good reason for concluding that the purchase should be made. If your concern is with good reasons for doing, with reasons that have any tendency to show that our doings are justified, any reference to ‘assenting’ to imperatives, to a readiness to engage in these doings, is in point of fact *irrelevant*, however important it may be in some other connection where our concern is not with good reasons for doing (with the cause one has for doing) but with how it happened that one acted (with what caused one to do).

It is precisely on this point that I wish to take exception to the contrast frequently drawn between reasons for doing and reasons for believing. According to this contrast the former cause agents to do, the latter cause minds to conclude or infer; and, since these are radically distinct functions of intelligence, reasons for doing and reasons for believing are mutually exclusive groups of items. Now it may be that reasons for doing are often cited in order to guide agents in their choices and conduct (although this is by no means true generally) but in so far as agents are rational, they desire above all else to be guided by considerations that justify them in choosing and in acting as they do. For it is the settled insistence of such agents—reasonable persons—that the things that cause them to do, where such doings are important and deliberated, are the considerations that justify them in their doings. But considerations that justify a person in acting as he does are considerations that justify him or anyone else in believing that he ought to act in that way. That is to say, they are good and sufficient reasons for doing precisely because and just to the extent that they are good and sufficient reasons for *believing* that such doings should be performed. A reason for doing that fails to meet this specification is counterfeit.

I have examined various attempts to construe reasons for doing as something other or more than mere matters of fact. I have argued that such attempts fail, that a consideration functions as a reason for doing—as something that justifies conduct—precisely to the extent that it refers us to some relevant matter of fact. This is true whether

our reasons for action are based on our evaluation of the merits of strawberries, the moral virtues of persons, or the moral qualities of their conduct. In all such cases what justifies our action is some matter of fact, and it is some matter of fact that justifies our action precisely because it is some matter of fact that justifies the conclusions we draw concerning the merit of whatever it is that interests and concerns us. Granted that in all such cases we are not pallid spectators of fact but concerned and committed agents, we are none the less rational beings and as such we are concerned not only to act but to act wisely as well, wherever possible, on the basis of reasons that are good and sufficient. For this purpose nothing less than relevant matters of fact will do. A reason for a given action may cause a person to perform that action, but the converse—that anything that causes a person to perform an action is a reason he has for performing it, something that establishes that his action is reasonable, is surely false. If this were true, every explanation would pass for a justification and every instance of folly for a case of practical wisdom.

Surely, then, it is false that an *ought* cannot be derived from an *is*, an evaluation from any statement of fact. Here one need only take seriously the notion of a reason for acting. For a reason for acting is a consideration that provides some warrant for the conclusion that an action should be performed. If good and sufficient, it is a consideration from which it *follows* that the action should be performed. But something is a reason for acting precisely because and just to the extent that it refers us to a matter of relevant fact. Accordingly, matters of fact can be good and sufficient justifying considerations. That is to say, matters of fact *as such* can and do fully establish matters of evaluation. It follows that if there are reasons for action, moral or otherwise, an *ought* most certainly is derivable from an *is*. The question is not whether, but how, and from what facts, matters of morality do follow.

Yet all of this must seem strange to those of us who have been brought up to regard as axiomatic the view that there is a gulf that separates describing or saying what is true (in order to guide belief or the assent of the mind) from offering reasons for doing (in order to guide the choices and actions of agents). Are we now to turn our back on an important distinction, to concede that all of the fuss raised on this score is scarcely worth the bother? And are we now to embrace some form of ethical naturalism after all that has been said about it in the recent literature?

Here we need to proceed with the greatest caution. To begin with,

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we need to view with suspicion the easy way in which 'describing' and 'saying what is true' are employed in the literature; for too often these are treated as synonyms. Is every case of saying what is true a case of describing? Suppose I say that there is a penny in my pocket, am I describing my pocket as indeed I would be if I were to say that it is large or torn. And am I describing or identifying the thing that is inside my pocket? Here is a description of what is inside my pocket: It is flat, round, and metallic. And if I say that there are no unicorns or that there are lions, what am I describing? Shall we say that what I am saying (shades of idealism!) is that the universe or reality is such that . . . —so what I am describing is the universe or reality? And why should we not say that one can describe the moral character of a person? But, much more to our present point, *what* have I said about an utterance when I say that it is used in order to say what is true or false, to assert a proposition? Far from its being the case that this is saying what the essential feature of its meaning is, such an account gives us only the barest skeleton of an answer. It leaves open all sorts of further matters to which attention needs to be paid. That is to say, far from telling us very much about the kind of thing involved in grasping its meaning, such an account gives us only a schema. One can say what is true or false—assert a proposition or make a truth-claim—by giving information, making a report, answering questions in an examination and thereby demonstrating one's learning, describing, promising, stating one's resolution, advising, judging, *et cetera, et cetera*. In some cases the appropriate response will be belief or disbelief, in others it will be an appraisal or an attitude, in still others some sort of action. The mere fact, then, that one is asserting a proposition or saying what is true in all of these cases by no means settles that one is doing the same thing, that if in one case one is guiding a person's assent in another one cannot be guiding his action. *Of course* there is an important difference between giving information and giving reasons for action, but this difference does not turn on the difference between saying something that is true or false and saying something to which 'true' or 'false' do not apply at all. Still less does it imply that the difference is one between saying what is the case and providing some one who is properly disposed (because, to use the jargon, he has 'assented' to an imperative) with some sort of push or prod to action. Something offered as a reason for action may be misunderstood as idle information. To that extent communication has broken down. But it is not established merely because it has a given effect. If I

shout "Jump" and startle someone into jumping, has he jumped because he understood me and obeyed?

Nor does it follow from my insistence that a matter of fact can provide a reason for doing, from my contention that matters of morality must be derivable from matters of fact if there are any moral reasons at all, that ethical naturalism is being defended. Certainly the accounts of moral reasoning offered by those who have been identified as ethical naturalists are defective no less than the accounts they have given us of the matter of facts that can or do serve as moral reasons. What are the matters of fact that justify moral conclusions and just how is their moral relevance established? What are the distinctive features of moral as distinct from other species of reasoning? How are we to construe the distinction between the theoretical and practical functions of intelligence, between idly noting matters of fact and recognizing these as reasons for doings? And, how precisely and in what sense do moral evaluations follow from the varied matters of fact that justify them? Unless these questions can be answered it is not likely that we shall even understand what the issues pro and con ethical naturalism really are.

Earlier I remarked that many recent writers, dissatisfied with the conclusions no less than with some of the features of the argument from trivialization employed by Moore, returned to doctrines long ago advocated by Hume. It is high time we recognize the transparent absurdity of the notion that no matter of fact can provide any moral reason for doing anything at all. I propose, therefore, that we make a fresh start, that once more we attempt to get our bearings in moral philosophy, this time by taking seriously the notion of a reason for doing and exploring in detail the issues involved in the questions I posed.

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SPECIAL COMMITTEES

Carus Lectures: D. W. Gotshalk, *Chairman*; (a) William K. Frankena, Philip Wheelwright; (b) Glenn R. Morrow, Donald C. Williams; (c) W. R. Dennes, Charner M. Perry. The terms of two members expire after the selection of a Carus Lecturer.

Bibliography of Philosophy—Editorial Center, U.S.A.: P. W. Kurtz, *Director* (1964); Rollo Handy (1962), Herbert W. Schneider (1962).

Philosophy in Education: R. G. Turnbull, *Chairman* (1964); H. G. Alexander (1963), R. M. Chisholm (1964), E. N. Garlan (1962), James Gutman (1962), William H. Hay (1962), Willis Moore (1964), Douglas Morgan (1963).

Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy: Wayne A. R. Leys, *Chairman* (1963); John D. Goheen (1963), Gregory Vlastos (1964).

DELEGATES

Delegate to the American Council of Learned Societies: Cornelius Krusé.

Delegate to the American Association for the Advancement of Science: A. Cornelius Benjamin.

The following were appointed to represent the Association:

Lewis E. Hahn, Hector N. Castaneda, Robert J. Henle, William J. Kilgore, O. A. Kubitz, Quinter M. Lyon, and William D. Nietmann at the Second Extraordinary Interamerican Congress in San José, Costa Rica, July 17-22, 1961;

William S. Weedon at the inauguration of David Young Pascall as President of the College of William and Mary, October 13, 1961;

Christopher Browne Garnett, Jr., at the inauguration of Randle

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Elliott as President of Hood College, October 14, 1961;

David Baumgardt at the inauguration of Henry David as President of the New School of Social Research, October 3, 1961;

Norman E. Richardson at the inauguration of Howard Lane Rubendall as President of Dickinson College, October 28, 1961;

Abraham Edel at the inauguration of the Very Reverend Edward J. Burke, C.M., as President of St. John's University, Jamaica, New York, November 1, 1961;

Yervant H. Krikorian at the inauguration of Arthur Ole Davidson as President of Wagner College, November 12, 1961;

Carlton W. Berenda at the inauguration of James Ralph Seales as President of Oklahoma Baptist University, Shawnee, Oklahoma, December 10, 1961;

Edward G. Ballard at the inauguration of John Hunter as President of Louisiana State University, April 7, 1962;

Elizabeth Flower and Sidney Axinn at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, April 13-14, 1962;

William Fontaine at the inauguration of Marvin Wachman as President of Lincoln University, April 29, 1962;

J. Glover Johnson at the inauguration of Vernon Roger Alden as President of Ohio University, May 11, 1962;

Justus Buchler and Sidney Morgenbesser at the First National Conference of the Congress of Scientists on Survival, New York City, June 15-17, 1962.

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Article I—NAME

The name of this organization shall be the American Philosophical Association.

Article II—MEMBERSHIP

1. The membership shall be membership in one or more Divisions or Affiliated Conferences of the Association.

2. The present Divisions are three: Eastern, Western, and Pacific. New divisions may be formed on application to the Board of Officers, with the approval of the Board of Officers and of the Executive Committees of all the existing Divisions.

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3. Regional groups organized on a permanent basis and holding one or more meetings a year may be recognized as Affiliated Conferences with the approval of the Board of Officers and of the Executive Committees of all the existing Divisions, and with the provision that they have conditions of membership comparable to those prevailing in the Association.

4. Each Division and Affiliated Conference shall elect its own members and officers and shall fix its own dues.

Article III—OFFICERS

1. The governing body of the Association shall be a Board of Officers, composed as follows:

The President of each Division, during his term of office.

The Secretary of each Division, during his term of office.

The Chairman of each of the three standing committees of the Association.

One member from each Division elected for a three-year term (terms staggered).

A Secretary-Treasurer elected for a three-year term by the Board of Officers.

The Chairman of the Board shall be elected by the Board from its membership for a three-year period. His term of office as Chairman shall not be affected by the expiration of his membership (otherwise) on the Board.

2. The Board of Officers shall determine the percentage of the dues of each Division and Affiliated Conference which is to be collected annually from their several treasurers by the national Secretary-Treasurer to defray the expenses of the Board of Officers and Standing Committees, and shall apportion, collect, and disburse the *pro rata* share of the expense of special joint projects.

Article IV—STANDING COMMITTEES

1. International Cultural Co-operation.

2. Publication

3. Information Service and Placement.

4. Any other committees which may be necessary for special projects. (Their chairmen do not belong *ex officio* to the Board of Officers.)

5. The Chairmen of these committees to be elected for five-year terms by the Board of Officers.

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Article V—PUBLICATIONS

The Association shall publish annually the proceedings and presidential addresses of the divisions together with the combined list of members and a report of the Board of Officers. This publication shall be in charge of the Secretary who shall furnish a copy to each member. The expense of publication shall be borne *pro rata* by the several divisions.

Article VI—AMENDMENTS

Amendments to this constitution may be made by a concurrent majority vote of the members of each division present at its regular annual meeting.

ACTIONS OF BOARD OF OFFICERS

The following motions were put before the Board of Officers by mail for their comments and vote. All passed unanimously.

MOTION 61-4—That the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association extend thanks to Paul C. Hayner for his care and devotion in execution of the demanding responsibilities placed upon him as Chairman of the Committee on Information Service.

MOTION 61-5—That the Committee on Information Service be given a supplementary appropriation of \$500 to provide it with semi-automatic sorting equipment.

MOTION 62-1—That the sum of \$150 be appropriated for the work of the Editorial Center, USA, of the *Bibliography of Philosophy* during 1962.

REPORT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE

At the Annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, held in Denver, December, 1961, the following program arranged by Norwood R. Hanson of the University of Indiana, was presented in eight sessions: I. Empiricism and the Status of Theories; II. Prediction and Causality; III. History and Philosophy of Science; IV. Conventionalism and Laws within Modern Physics; V. Induction, and Vice-Presidential Address; VI. Machines and Brains; VII. Methodological Problems of the Social Sciences; and VIII. The Nature of Historical Explanation. All sessions were cosponsored by

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the American Philosophical Association, the Philosophy of Science Association, and Section L of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

June 30, 1962

A. CORNELIUS BENJAMIN

REPORT OF THE DELEGATE TO THE AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The forty-third Annual Meeting of the ACLS was held in the Carnegie Endowment International Center in New York City on January 20-21, 1962. It was preceded by a meeting of the Conference of Secretaries of the thirty constituent societies of the Council. Lewis E. Hahn was elected Conference chairman for the ensuing year.

In the morning of January 20 Dr. Claude Bissell, President of the University of Toronto and Chairman of the Canada Council on the Arts, Humanities, and the Social Sciences, delivered an address on "The Canada Council and the Arts." Members of the Association may or may not know that the Canada Council was established by the Canadian Federal Government in 1957 for the purpose of "fostering and promoting the study and enjoyment of, and the production of works in the arts, humanities, and social sciences." The Canadian Government gave the Council an endowment fund of \$50 million, as well as a second sum of \$50 million to be used on a matching basis for grants to universities for buildings in the humanities, social sciences, and arts. Of these amounts so far 55 per cent has gone to the arts and 45 per cent to the humanities and social sciences. Any member of our Association interested in learning how a government council can remain autonomous and effectively foster the arts and the humanities in a democracy may write the Council headquarters for a copy of this revealing and inspiring address (*Newsletter*, March 1962, 345 E. 46th Street, New York 17, N.Y.). Stimulated by this address the participants in the annual meeting met in four separate discussion groups to discuss the relationship of the ACLS to the arts. (It may be remembered that in 1961 similar discussion groups considered the relationship between the humanities and the social sciences.) In the afternoon of January 20 the discussion groups devoted themselves to a consideration of the general and long range future program and policy of the Council as the organization representing humanistic scholarship in this country.

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At the Annual Dinner Chairman Robert M. Lumiansky announced the recipients of the 1962 award of the ten ACLS Prizes for Distinguished Scholarship in the Humanities of \$10,000 each. Filmer S. C. Northrop was one of the scholars honored by this award. Unfortunately, for lack of funds these awards cannot be continued.

Inn the annual business session of the Council on the morning of January 21, President Burkhart presented a report on the activities of the A.C.L.S. during the preceding year. In this period fifty-three awards of fellowships, selected from 361 applicants, were made, averaging \$5,259 with a total of \$274,600. This year the fellowship program was also opened to scholars over forty-five years of age, and more awards were given than before to the smaller liberal arts colleges. The range in age was very broad, namely from 31 to 74, though the median was 41. Six recipients of these fellowships were members of departments of philosophy.

The president also announced the establishment of a new fellowship program to be called ACLS Study Fellowships which are designed to assist young scholars ("normally under 36 years of age") in the humanities and the social sciences to enlarge their range of knowledge by study in fields different from, though related to, their areas of present specialization. This program is really a renewal of a similar program, in effect in 1950-2, which was highly successful but could not be continued for lack of funds. In its grant of \$5,670,000 to the ACLS, reported last year, the Ford Foundation specified that over a ten-year period the sum of \$750,000 should be devoted to a renewal and extension of this fellowship program. Arrangements have been made with the Center for advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Palo Alto and with the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University for Fellows, who so wish, to carry on their studies in the company of the distinguished scholars who reside and work at these two research institutions.

During the past year nine leading scholars have been commissioned by the ACLS to write papers on the content objectives of the social studies curriculum of the secondary schools. Publication of these reports is expected in September.

The ACLS continues its contribution to the support of institutes in the humanities for secondary school teachers. This summer there will be an institute in Latin at the University of Michigan and one in Music at Bennington College. It is encouraging to note that the Council as well as its constituent members are increasingly becoming interested in the role and importance of secondary schools in educa-

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

tion. Time was when this important sector of American education was neglected by learned societies and their Councils. What Dr. Charles Keller, Director of the John Hay Fellows Program, calls the "sheep-skin curtain" is in process of being removed, with the benefit of education at all levels. In ACLS reports reference was made to the important study made by a committee of our Association, under the chairmanship of Charles Hendel, of the teaching of philosophy in American High Schools.

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange program which was successfully negotiated by the Council and the Soviet Academy of Sciences finally got under way. While in the words of President Burkhart the "program has been full of frustrations and has required the utmost in patience," four U.S. scholars, selected jointly by the ACLS-SSRC Advisory Committee, were finally received by the Academy. These scholars reported excellent treatment and an extremely worthwhile experience, both personal and professional. The first four Soviet scholars arrived early in April, 1962. New agreements call for an exchange of seven lecturers and 12-15 research scholars during 1962-3. The research visits will average 5-6 months. Other joint agreements include scholarly congresses, and a greater exchange of scholarly publications.

Early in 1962 President Burkhart attended a meeting of the Council on Higher Education in the American Republics held in Rio de Janeiro.

The Council continues to take an active interest in federal educational programs. Mr. Burkhart testified before a Senate sub-committee in behalf of the current bills for aid to higher education. Dr. Charles Blitzer, a new ACLS staff member, will include in his responsibilities maintenance of liaison of the Council with both executive and legislative branches of the government.

The Council, in its Annual Meeting unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

RESOLVED, That this Council regards it as imperative, in the national interest and for the strengthening of American education on the broadest possible front, that the Federal Government extend its support of summer and academic year institutes for secondary school teachers to include the basic humanistic and social studies on the same basis as modern foreign languages, mathematics, and the natural sciences.

RESOLVED, That this Council very strongly urges that the Federal

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Government, in the national interest and for the strengthening of our scholarly and intellectual resources on the broadest possible front, extend its support of higher education and research to include all the humanities and the social sciences on the same basis as mathematics, the natural sciences, and technology.

In the discussion following the adoption of the resolution it was pointed out that personal letters from individuals to their Congressmen carry the greatest weight with them. It was therefore hoped that members of the Council's constituent societies would communicate their views on this matter to their Congressmen.

The Treasurer of the Council, Whitney J. Oates, announced that it was his "pleasant duty to report that the ACLS is in excellent financial health." He reminded members of the Council that the major portion of the Council's expenditures benefit the membership of the constituent societies in the form of Fellowships, Grants-in-Aid, Travel Grants, funds for Congresses and Conferences and other aids. (The Council publishes a brochure entitled Aids to Scholars, Competition to be held in 1962-3, which members may procure upon request at the Council's address given above.)

The American Dialect Society was elected to membership in the Council. There are now 31 constituent societies in the Council.

The next meeting of the Council will probably be held in Washington, and the program may give central attention to the various activities of the government which would be of special interest to the Council and its constituent societies.

The Council elected the following officers for the present Council year:

Chairman: Robert M. Lumiansky

Vice Chairman: Albert H. Marckwardt

Secretary: Curt F. Buhler

Treasurer: Whitney J. Oates

The American Philosophical Association was represented at the Annual Meeting by its secretary, Lewis E. Hahn and its delegate, Cornelius Krusé.

June 30, 1962

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

Committee on International Cultural Cooperation

This Committee during the past year has centered its work on the preparations for and conduct of the Conference on TOLERANCE held by the International Institute of Philosophy at the Goleta (Santa Barbara) campus of the University of California, August 25-29, 1961. Quite independently of the efforts of this Committee several of the European members of the Institute received appointments before or following the conference to lecture at American Universities: Ayer, Ewing, Jessop, van Breda, and Weil. Several members who had been scheduled to participate were prevented by illness: Calogero, Klibansky, Marcel, Tatarkiewicz, and Wahl. Tragic deaths robbed the Institute of two of its prominent members, Gaston Berger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Despite these misfortunes foreign attendance was sufficient to provide lively discussion. In addition to the first mentioned five members the participants from abroad were: Arbousse-Bastide, Barzin, Basu, Cannabrava, Dufrenne, Kotarbinski, Kuhn, Marias, Mercier, Morot-Sir, Nikam, Oribe, Pandeya, Perelman, Rotenstreich, Wisdom, and the members of the Paris Secretariats: Mlle. Peslouan, Mm. Bammate, d'Ormesson, Dumery, and Varet. The President of the East German Philosophical Association, Klaus Zweiling, submitted a paper and was invited to attend, but was unable to get a passport from West Berlin. The American members of the Institute who participated were: Ferrater Mora, Krusé, McKeon, and Schneider. Other Americans invited by the Institute from the members of the A.P.A. were: Bahm, Benjamin, Flower, Hahn, Hungerland (Mr. and Mrs.), Merlan (Mr. and Mrs.), Charles A. Moore, Nietmann, Popkin, and Schrecker. The members of the Santa Barbara Philosophy Department, especially Professors Girvetz, Wienpahl, and Wilkinson, were hosts, and through them the Fund for the Republic (represented by Scott Buchanan) gave a grant of a thousand dollars which, added to the grant made by the A.P.A. to its Committee and several individual gifts, enabled the hosts to make the meetings very pleasant indeed. The discussions of Santa Barbara were continued for several days by another conference at the luxurious mountain conference center of the University of California on Lake Arrowhead, at which about thirty of the above named participants from Santa Barbara and a group of other members of the A.P.A. (Blau, Hutchison, Mayer, Meyerhoff, Ruja, Stern, Werkmeister, Wheelwright) met with an equal number of citizens of Southern California.

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The papers submitted to both conferences on Tolerance and as much of the discussions as it was possible to record have been edited by the Blaisdell Institute for publication.

As a result of conversations begun during the East-West Philosophical Conferences of 1959 at the University of Hawaii, Professor P. T. Raju of the University of Rajasthan was invited by your Committee to lecture at several American universities on Comparative Philosophy and to cooperate in the preparation of a textbook which would bring together Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. The Blaisdell Institute at Claremont, California, offered to be his initial host and to cooperate in the preparation of the textbook. Professor Raju arrived in May, 1960 and worked for two months at the Blaisdell Institute before lecturing at Stanford University and before visiting other American institutions and participating in several meetings of the Association. The progress of this project was interrupted by a call to Professor Raju from the University of Mainz, Germany, to be visiting professor during 1961. It seemed desirable to all parties concerned, including the Asia Foundation, that Professor Raju should accept this appointment and return early in 1962 to complete his work on the textbook. Meanwhile, Professor Raju has arranged to have his book on Comparative Philosophy, in which he expounded and compared Indian, Chinese, and European traditions, published by the University of Nebraska Press, and it is scheduled to appear during the summer of 1962. As we worked together on a plan for an East-West textbook, we realized that to give an adequate introduction to the Oriental and Western traditions in one volume would make a bulky and cumbersome volume which would not serve well as a college text. On the advice of several publishers and colleagues, we decided to enlarge our project into a series of small paper-backs which could be used jointly or separately. The first of these projected volumes on India's philosophical traditions has been completed by Professor Raju and is being sent to the publisher. A second volume by Herbert W. Schneider on European philosophical traditions will be ready toward the end of 1962. A third volume on the Chinese traditions by a Chinese author (not yet determined) is scheduled for 1963. Other volumes may be supplied as needed and should serve as at least a beginning in the presentation of both Eastern and Western traditions for both Oriental and Western schools. The Blaisdell Institute has undertaken to continue the editing of this series.

Among the visitors from abroad (in addition to those mentioned above) who have paid visits to members of the Association during

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this year are the following: Matsuo Ara (University of Tokyo), John M. Findlay (University of London), Shokin Furuta (Hokkaido University), D. K. Garde (Poona), Gen Miyata (Tokyo), Hajime Nakamura (Tokyo), A. S. N. Pillai (Trivandrum), Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (Milan), Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz (University of Warsaw), and Syed Vahidduddin (Hyderabad).

This is an incomplete list, but in spite of its desirability no central office for collecting information of this nature has been established either by this Committee or by any other organization.

In behalf of the International Congress to be held in Mexico City, September 7-14, 1963, this Committee has been cooperating with Secretary Hahn and the Board of Officers of the Association. Mr. Krusé, who is taking the initiative in this work, and Mr. McKeon, as well as several other members of the Committee have begun negotiations and correspondence for the purpose of securing appointments for Europeans at institutions in the United States, either before or after the Congress, as a means of meeting their travel expenses. A few appointments appear to have been made definite already. The International Institute of Philosophy at Paris has agreed to provide a list of European philosophers who might appropriately be considered for such appointments, and this list will be circulated by the Committee as soon as it is available.

Charles A. Moore and his committee have begun their planning for the 1964 East-West Conference at the University of Hawaii.

Patrick Romanell was sent by the State Department on a cultural mission during the summer of 1961 to the following countries of Central and South America: Costa Rica, Bolivia, Paraguay, Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. He also participated in the Second Extraordinary Interamerican Congress of Philosophy, San Jose, Costa Rica, July 17-22, 1961, and in the International Dental Congress in La Paz, Bolivia, July 20-August 6, 1961.

I should like to close this report with a brief statement concerning finances:

The sum of \$275 appropriated by the Board of Officers (Motion 60-13) for the use of this Committee during this year has been spent for stationery, postage, and clerical assistance.

The \$1,000 received from the Fund for the Republic to help defray the expenses of the Santa Barbara Conference (Motion 61-3) was spent as follows: \$500 spent by the Department of Philosophy at Santa Barbara for local arrangements and hospitality; the other \$500 spent under the direction of the Chairman of this Committee for translating, mimeo-

PROCEEDINGS

graphing, and distribution of papers, programs, and other documents for the Conference.

A deficit of \$700 incurred in connection with the Lake Arrowhead Conference was paid by the Blaisdell Institute.

The sum of \$4,000 appropriated for the expenses of Professor P. T. Raju by the Asia Foundation (1960) was paid to him in four installments by Secretaries Garvin and Hahn.

This accounts for all the funds available to this Committee.

In view of the extraordinary efforts which will be necessary during the coming year, the Chairman of this Committee has approached the Asia Foundation for a substantial subsidy intended primarily for promoting our relations with philosophers and their institutions in Asia. The success or failure of this appeal for funds will depend in part on the Association's willingness to continue to appropriate what it can toward the expenses of this Committee, and therefore the attention of the Board of Officers is respectfully called to the circumstances.

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Committee on Publication

The Committee on Publication, thanks to the continuing donations of the Eastern and Western Divisions, and the devoted services of Virgil Aldrich over many years, is now in a better position than ever before to be of some assistance to members of the Association in their efforts to publish high quality books or monograph length manuscripts (excluding doctoral dissertations) which make original contributions to philosophy. Interested members should make preliminary inquiries of various publishers, including university presses, to determine the best possible arrangements, before asking the Committee for a supporting loan. Such loans are repayable to the Committee from payments which are made by the publisher to the author. For further information members should write directly to the Chairman.

The Committee has cut its requests to the various divisions for supporting funds to half the amounts previously given. The present membership of the Committee comprises: Professors Virgil Aldrich (Kenyon), W. R. Dennes (California), Edward H. Madden (San Jose State), Marten ten Hoor (Alabama), Morton G. White (Harvard), and Charles A. Baylis (Duke), Chairman.

The Annual report of the Editor of the Science Series is appended.
May, 1962

CHARLES A. BAYLIS

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

The following five books in the Source Book Series will be published at various intervals within the year by Harvard University Press:

Mathematical Logic (John van Heijenoort); *Classical Analysis* (Garrett Birkhoff); *Renaissance and Enlightenment Mathematics* (Dirk Struik); *History of Psychology* (E. G. Boring and R. J. Herrnstein); and *Geology 1900-50* (Kirtley Mather). As these volumes appear, Harvard Press plans to advertise the whole series widely.

The following volumes are in various stages of preparation. *Medieval Science* (Richard McKeon, Marshall Clagett, and Ernest Moody); *History of Botany* (Conway Zirkle); *Mathematics 1900-50* (Garrett Birkhoff); *Physics 1900-50* (Henry Leicester). The Editorial Board meets in Cambridge on May 5, 1962, and will choose editors for *Botany 1900-50*, and *Philosophy of Science: The Renaissance through the Nineteenth Century*.

The present Editorial Board, in addition to the General Editor, includes Professors I. Bernard Cohen (Harvard); Marshall Clagett (University of Wisconsin); C. J. Ducasse (Brown); Ernst Mayr (Harvard); Ernest Moody (U.C.L.A.); Ernest Nagel (Columbia); Harlow Shapley (Harvard); and Harry Woolf (University of Washington).

EDWARD H. MADDEN, GENERAL EDITOR

Committee on Information Service

Appreciation should first of all be expressed for the dedicated services of Professor Paul C. Hayner, who resigned from the chairmanship during the past year, and to Professor John S. Linnell, who resigned as representative of the Pacific Division. The new members of the Committee are Professors Whitaker T. Deiningner of San Jose State College as representative of the Pacific Division and William H. Leue of New York State University; College at Albany, as representative of the Eastern Division.

The past year, July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962 has been the busiest year in the history of the Committee. There were more notices of openings reported to the Committee and more registrants appointed to positions than ever before. The statistics for the Committee's operations during the past year are as follows:

Notices of openings in which Committee help was requested	143
Openings filled by Committee nominees	51

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Openings filled by Committee registrants not nominated	8
Non-registrants appointed to reported openings	29
Openings cancelled after listing	10
Results undetermined or unreported	45

The previous high in reported openings was 104; in openings filled by nominees, 34. The number of unreported situations is also at an all-time high. In addition to the 143 openings listed above, Committee registrants were appointed to 16 positions not serviced by the Committee. Thus 75 Committee registrants found jobs during the past year.

There are presently 279 active candidates registered with the Committee as compared with 458 last year. Approximately 120 candidates are seeking positions as Instructors (most of these are graduate students); 100 are seeking appointment as Assistant Professors, and approximately 60 are seeking positions as Associate or Full Professors.

The decrease in the number of active registrants is partly due to the reclassification of inactive candidates previously listed as active, and in part to the fact that many former registrants are now employed. There has been a marked expansion in job opportunities for professional philosophers. One factor in this expansion is the explosion in university enrollments and the consequent enlargement of departments; another is the trend toward the transformation of Teachers Colleges into Liberal Arts colleges, necessitating the creation of new departments of philosophy. A minor factor worthy of note: during the past year 3 registrants skilled in symbolic logic found employment with companies working in the field of electronic communications.

As in previous years the bulk of the requests to the Committee were for teachers at the junior levels, but there have also been requests for teachers at senior levels, for men to serve as chairmen of departments, and for retired professors to fill one-year appointments. The statistics given above show that the Committee's services are being more widely utilized. The dean of a small college wrote to the Committee expressing the wish that all of the academic disciplines might have a service similar to that of the American Philosophical Association.

The Committee was represented at the divisional meetings as in former years, to arrange interviews between employing officers and candidates as well as to provide public information about candidates and positions. The Committee expresses its appreciation for the courtesies of the host institutions in providing rooms and making other arrangements for carrying on this work.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

The financial statement to June 30, 1962 is as follows:

Receipts

Balance, July 1, 1961 received from Paul C. Hayner	\$122.00
Received from APA, November 15, 1961,	
Lewis E. Hahn, Secretary-Treasurer	500.00
	622.00

Expenditures

Postage	\$173.42
Printing	221.35
Supplies	15.50
Secretarial help	13.00
	423.27
Balance, June 30, 1962	198.73

It should be noted that Roosevelt University generously contributed support to the Committee during the past year in the form of secretarial help and duplicating services and materials. These services would have cost the Committee approximately \$250. As a consequence of this help the Committee's financial report shows a surplus rather than a deficit.

The Committee requests the continued cooperation and support of the members of the Association.

June 30, 1962

LIONEL RUBY

Committee on Philosophy in Education

Various members of the Committee and chairmen of the subcommittees have continued distributing the four reports published in *Proceedings and Addresses 1958-59*. Liaison has continued with the Philosophy of Education Society, and various contacts have been made or continued with persons who are interested in or actually teaching philosophy courses in high schools. A number of requests for the report on "Criteria for Constituting a Department of Philosophy" have been honored, and it is evident that it has proved useful in clarifying to college administrators the role of a philosophy department.

The Committee has undertaken no new projects and, in accordance with its patent from the National Board of Officers, will be undertaking none until requested to do so by the National Board.

PROCEEDINGS

There remains \$207.34 of the \$5,000 grant from the Fund for the Advancement of Education. It is anticipated that the expenses of continuing distribution of the four original reports and of maintaining connections with various agencies will exhaust those funds within a year.

ROBERT G. TURNBULL

Carus Lectures Committee

Following the delivery of Stephen C. Pepper's Carus series *Concept and Quality* at the Vancouver meetings of the Pacific Division of the Association in the fall of 1961, the Carus Lectures Committee elected Ernest Nagel of Columbia University to be the fourteenth Carus Lecturer, Professor Rudolf Carnap having declined an appointment. Professor Nagel is scheduled to give the three lectures that will constitute his series at the meetings of the Western Division of the Association in the Spring of 1963. The title of his lectures will be announced later.

With the election of Professor Nagel, the terms on the Committee of A. C. Benjamin and Melvin Rader expired. Appointed to take their place by Dr. Cornelius Krusé acting for the National Board of Officers are William K. Frankena of the University of Michigan and Philip Wheelwright of the University of California, Riverside. The Committee wishes to express its warmest thanks to its two retiring members for their excellent services, and to welcome with equal warmth the two new members. Besides Frankena and Wheelwright and the chairman, the Committee consists of Charner Perry, W. R. Dennes, Glenn R. Morrow, and D. C. Williams.

All ten of the previously published Carus Lectures volumes, from Dewey's *Experience and Nature* to Boas's *The Inquiring Mind*, are still in print and available at the Open Court Publishing Company, La Salle, Illinois. Three of the titles are also available in paperback: the Dewey, the Lovejoy, and the Cohen volumes, while a paperback edition of C. I. Lewis's *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* is in preparation. Also scheduled for future publication, although the manuscripts have not yet been completed, are Arthur Murphy's *The Theory of Practical Reason*, and the Pepper volume *Concept and Quality*. Brand Blanshard's recent series *Reason and Analysis* is being published this Spring simultaneously by Allen & Unwin in Great Britain and the Open Court Publishing Company in America.

June, 1962

D. W. GOTSHALK

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy

Professor Gregory Vlastos succeeded Professor Ernest Nagel as the Eastern Division's representative on the Committee. The Committee did not have a meeting during the year, but carried on its work by correspondence.

A number of inquiries were received from members of the Association who desired information regarding the possibility of travel grants and research funds. It seems appropriate to repeat here the procedures for travel grants:

1. When the American Philosophical Association has travel grants for international meetings, the Chairman or Secretary of the National Board of Officers will announce when and where applications will be received.

2. Applications for ACLS travel grants needing APA endorsement will first ascertain the availability of ACLS grants for the meeting they wish to attend; second, request the Secretary (Professor Lewis Hahn, Washington University, St. Louis 30, Missouri) to recommend them.

3. Applications will be forwarded to the Chairman of this Committee, and he will poll the Committee, forwarding the results to the appropriate officials.

The Chairman of the Committee has made some inquiries regarding the availability of travel grants for the International Congress of Philosophy to be held in Mexico City, September 7-14, 1963, but is not ready to report definite results at this writing. A travel plan to secure reduced group-rates was submitted to the Board of Officers, but its feasibility was still to be determined.

WAYNE A. R. LEYS

June 30, 1962

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY, EDITORIAL CENTER, U.S.A.

There were approximately 565 philosophy books published in the United States in 1961 (*Publisher's Weekly*, Jan., 1961), a marked increase over the previous year and the highest on record. This included 433 new books, 132 re-editions, 42 imports, and 66 translations. Paperbacks, textbooks, and anthologies continue at a high rate.

The *Bibliography of Philosophy* has succeeded in accelerating its publication schedule, and current books are now reported soon

PROCEEDINGS

after they appear. Receipts for the year were \$225 and expenditures \$223.60.

U.N.E.S.C.O. is helping to underwrite a new Centre de Documentation, which will attempt to provide a central index for all scholarly work produced throughout the world. The International Institute of Philosophy has been charged with the task of compiling information on philosophy. The Centre de Documentation is under the Directorship of Professor Gilbert Varet (18, Rue Chifflet, Besançon, France) and will work in collaboration with the *Bibliography of Philosophy*. The U. S. Editorial Center will provide data on philosophy in the United States. Vol. I, which will be published in 1963, will provide a world-wide report on the teaching of philosophy in Universities, Philosophical Institutes and Associations, and periodicals and publishers specializing in philosophy.

PAUL W. KURTZ, DIRECTOR

June, 1962

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

AUDIT REPORT

1409 Marlann Drive
St. Louis 22, Mo.
August 16, 1962

The American Philosophical Association
Executive Committee
c/o Dr. Lewis E. Hahn
Washington University
St. Louis 30, Missouri

Gentlemen:

I have examined the Balance Sheet of The American Philosophical Association at June 30, 1962 and related Statements of Cash Receipts and Disbursements and Fund Balances for the year then ended. The balances in banks and savings and loan associations, as well as the receipts from the three divisions and Antioch Press were confirmed by direct correspondence with the appropriate officers.

In my opinion, the accompanying balance sheet, cash receipts and disbursements and fund balances present fairly the financial position of the American Philosophical Association at June 30, 1962 and the receipts and disbursements and fund balances for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

Very truly yours,
RALPH J. WINSTON
Certified Public Accountant

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET
JUNE 30, 1961 and 1962

ASSETS

Exhibit A

	June 30, 1962	June 30, 1961	Increase or (Decrease)
Cash in Bank:			
Checking Account	\$ 1,017.98	\$ 4,174.51	\$ (3,156.53)
Savings Account	5,291.48	5,125.75	165.73
Savings and Loan	10,297.75	9,873.68	424.07
Savings and Loan	10,297.75	9,873.68	424.07
Notes Receivable—Western Division	\$26,904.96	\$29,047.62	\$ (2,142.66)
		255.87	(255.87)
Total Assets	\$26,904.96	\$29,303.49	\$ (2,398.53)
FUND EQUITIES			
General Treasury (Exhibit B, Schedules 1 and 2)	\$5,747.75	5,043.01	\$ 704.74
Revolving Fund for Publications:			
Source Book Fund (Exhibit B, Schedule 3)	13,201.22	15,327.04	(2,125.82)
New Publications Fund (Exhibit B, Schedule 3)	6,539.39	5,570.72	968.67
	1,416.60	3,362.72	(1,946.12)
American Philosophical Association Fund (Exhibit B, Schedule 3)			
Total Fund Equities	\$26,904.96	\$29,303.49	\$ (2,398.53)

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION GENERAL TREASURY FUND RECEIPTS For the Year Ended June 30, 1962

Exhibit B (Schedule 1)

Balance, June 30, 1961:

Cash
Note Receivable

\$4,787.14
255.87

\$5,043.01

Receipts:

	Pacific Division	Eastern Division	Western Division	Total
Proceedings	\$326.73	\$1,276.86(1)	\$ 722.95	\$2,326.54
National Dues	134.00	510.00	296.50	940.50
International Federation Dues	26.80	102.00	59.30	188.10
Assessments for Committee on Information Service	56.99	216.91	126.10	400.00
	<u>\$544.52</u>	<u>\$2,105.77</u>	<u>\$1,204.85</u>	

3,855.14
431.33
255.87
216.59

Total Receipts and Beginning Balance

\$9,801.94

- (1) Represents balance of \$1,105.77 on Vol XXXIII and \$171.09 partial payment on Vol. XXXIV.
- (2) Interest on deposits was allocated to the various funds on the basis of the balances of these funds.

PROCEEDINGS

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION GENERAL TREASURY FUND DISBURSEMENTS For the Year Ended June 30, 1962

Exhibit B (Schedule 2)

\$9,801.94

Total Receipts and Beginning Balance (Exhibit B, Schedule 1)

Disbursements:

Printing and Distributing <i>Proceedings</i>	\$2,293.19
<i>Pro-rata</i> Return to Eastern Division of Income from Sale of <i>Proceedings</i>	233.89
<i>Pro-rata</i> Return to Western Division of Income from Sale of <i>Proceedings</i>	135.98
<i>Pro-rata</i> Return to Pacific Division of Income from Sale of <i>Proceedings</i>	61.46
Committee on Information Service	500.00
<i>Bibliography of Philosophy</i>	150.00
Dues-Fédération Internationale des Sociétés Philosophiques	188.10
Dues-American Council of Learned Societies	91.65
Postage and Telephone	37.79
Supplies	2.26
Clerical and Secretarial Expenses	64.00
Audit Fee	40.00

3,798.32

Total Disbursements

\$6,003.62

Deduct Decrease in Note

255.87

Balance, June 30, 1962 (Represented by Cash in Bank)

\$5,747.75

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION SOURCE BOOK FUND, NEW PUBLICATIONS FUND, AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION FUND SUMMARY OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS

For the Year Ended June 30, 1962

Exhibit B (Schedule 3)

	Source Book Fund	New Publications Fund	American Philosophical Association Fund
Balance, June 30, 1961	\$15,327.04	\$5,570.72	\$3,362.72
Receipts:			
Royalties—Harvard Press	1.93098		
Royalties—Antioch Press		22.24	
Western Division's Contribution to Publications Committee		200.00	
Eastern Division's Contribution to Publications Committee		500.00	
Interest on Deposits (1)	497.47	246.43	53.38
Total Receipts and Beginning Balance	\$17,755.49	\$6,539.39	\$3,416.10
Disbursements:			
Expenses—Geology Source Book	2,000.00		
Expenses—Source Book on Mathematical Logic	1,554.27		
Expenses—Source Book on Classical Analysis	1,000.00		
Committee on International Cultural Cooperation- Expenses, P. T. Raju			1,999.50
Balance, June 30, 1962	\$ 4554.27		\$1,199.50
	\$13,201.22	\$6,539.39	\$1,416.60

(1) Interest on deposits allocated to various funds on the basis of the balances of these funds.

PROCEEDINGS

EASTERN DIVISION

NEWLY ELECTED OFFICERS FOR 1962

President—Maurice Mandelbaum

Vice-President—Roderick Chisholm

Secretary-Treasurer—Elizabeth F. Flower (December 31, 1962)

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and Carl G. Hempel *ex officio* for one year, John Rawls (1963), William Stone Weedon (1962), E. M. Adams (1963), Alan Ross Anderson (1963), John Ladd (1964), and Francis H. Parker (1964).

OFFICERS FOR 1961

President—Carl G. Hempel

Vice-President—Charles Hartshorne

Secretary-Treasurer—Elizabeth F. Flower

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and John Wild *ex officio* for one year, Monroe C. Beardsley (1961), Albert Hofstadter (1961), John Rawls (1962), William Stone Weedon (1962), E. M. Adams (1963), and Alan Ross Anderson (1963).

PROGRAM

The fifty-eighth annual meeting of the Eastern Division was held at Chalfonte-Haddon Hall, Atlantic City, December 27-29, 1961. The following program was presented:

Wednesday, December 27

(Afternoon)

Symposium: POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
(Chairman and Commentator, Glenn R. Morrow)

Richard A. Wasserstrom: *Disobeying the Law.*

Hugo A. Bedau: *On Civil Disobedience.*

Stuart M. Brown, Jr.: *Civil Disobedience.*

Symposium: MODAL LOGIC (Joint Session with the Association for Symbolic Logic. Chairman and Commentator, Arthur F. Smullyan)

Alan Ross Anderson and Nuel Belnap, Jr.: *Enthymemes.*

Henry Hiz: *Modalities and Extended Systems.*

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY (Chairman, Wilfrid Sellars)

John Silber: *Acts of Volition.*

Commentator: Elmer Sprague.

Gerald E. Myers: *Motives and Wants.*

Commentator: Zeno Vendler.

Daniel D. O'Connor: *Consciousness and the Body.*

Commentator: John Fisher.

LANGUAGE, EXPERIENCE, AND ACTION (Chairman, Alice Ambrose Lazercowitz)

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Lewis W. Beck: *Actor, Spectator, and Judge.*

Commentator: Ruth B. Marcus.

Virgil Aldrich: *Too Obvious for Words.*

Commentator: Jerome Shaffer.

C. D. Rollins: *Contingent Privacy That is Complete.*

Commentator: Martin Lean.

(Evening)

SMOKER

Thursday, December 28

(Morning)

Symposium: DECISION THEORY AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL SIGNIFICANCE (Chairman and Commentator, Hugues Leblanc)

Patrick Suppes: *The Philosophical Relevance of Decision Theory.*

Isaac Levi: *Decision Theory and Confirmation.*

MENTAL EVENTS (Chairman and Commentator, D. J. O'Connor)

Richard Taylor: *The Stream of Thoughts versus Mental Acts.*

Keith Lehrer: *Psychological States and Agency.*

LOGIC (Chairman, John W. Blyth)

Storrs McCall: *Contrariety.*

Commentator: Stephen Barker.

George M. Van Sant: *Breaking Logical Laws.*

Commentator: Thomas E. Patton.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY (Chairman and Commentator, George B. Burch)

Kurt F. Leidecker: *The Classification of Indian "Darsanas."*

J. A. B. Van Buitenen: *Knowledge in Indian Philosophy.*

PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE (Chairman, Edward G. Ballard)

J. G. Brennan: *Is There a Philosophy of Literature?*

Commentator: Houston Peterson.

George A. Clark: *Proper Names in Logic and Literature.*

Commentator: Gertrude Ezorsky.

(Afternoon)

IN COMMEMORATION OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD (1861-1947)

(Chairman and Commentator, Charles Hartshorne)

Robert Palter: *Whitehead's Theory of Relativity: Its Scientific and Philosophic Implications.*

A. H. Johnson: *Some Aspects of Whitehead's Social Philosophy.*

William A. Christian: *The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion.*

ETHICS (Chairman, John Hospers)

Paul W. Kurtz: *Decision-Making and Ethical Naturalism.*

Commentator: Charles A. Baylis.

John W. Lenz: *Universalizability as a Criterion of Moral Prescriptions.*

Commentator: Elizabeth L. Bearsdsley.

Joel Feinberg: *Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals.*

Commentator: Paul Welsh.

PROCEEDINGS

THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (Chairman, Roderick Firth)

C. J. Ducasse: *Is "Knowing 'That'" Reducible to "Knowing 'How'?"*

Commentator: Vere C. Chappell.

Colin M. Turbayne: *The Linguistic Model versus the Camera Model in Vision.*

Commentator: Willis Doney.

Ramon M. Lemos: *Ideas, Images, and Sensations.*

Commentator: Theodore T. Lafferty.

PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE (Chairman, Morris Lazerowitz)

Norman Kretzmann: *Significance, Syntax, and Supposition.*

Commentator: Paul Ziff.

Lawrence Resnick: *Are Concepts Useful?*

Commentator: K. D. Irani.

Richard M. Gale: *Is It Now Now?*

Commentator: Jack Kaminsky.

TEA

BANQUET

Presidential Address by Carl G. Hempel: *Rational Action.*

Friday, December 29

(Morning)

Symposium: JUSTIFICATION (Chairman, Richard B. Brandt)

Commentators: Nelson Goodman and Ernest Nagel.

Joseph Ullian: *Luck, License, and Lingo.*

Roderick Chisholm: *Rationality and Direct Justification.*

Sidney Morgenbesser: *A Note on Justification in the Sciences.*

EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS (Chairman, Paul Holmer)

Richard B. Angell: *Logic and Existentialist Ethics.*

Commentator: Luther Binkley.

Louis H. Mackey: *The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics.*

Commentator: José Ferrater Mora.

Richard Schmitt: *Kierkegaard's Ethics and Its Teleological Suspension.*

Commentator: Wilfrid Desan.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (Chairman, Raphael Demos)

Max Rieger: *Aesthetic Realism.*

Commentator: Robert Rosthal.

Stanley H. Rosen: *Thought and Touch: A Note on the "De Anima."*

Commentator: James F. O'Brien.

David Platt: *Value, Reality, and Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Theistic Proof.*

Commentator: William L. Reese.

(Afternoon)

Symposium: PHENOMENOLOGY (Chairman and Commentator, Marvin Farber)

Aron Gurwitsch: *The Problem of Existence in Constitutive Phenomenology.*

Quentin Lauer: *Questioning the Phenomenologists.*

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

AESTHETICS (Chairman, Barrows Dunham)

Milton C. Nahm: *Katherine Gilbert's "Ideal Trafficker with Art" and the Relation of Aesthetics and Art-Criticism.*

Commentator: Theodore Mischel.

Sidney Axinn: *"And Yet": A Kantian Analysis of Aesthetic Interest.*

Commentator: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.

Jeanne Wacker: *Intention in Art Criticism.*

Commentator: Kingsley Price.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Chairman and Commentator, A. J. Ayer)

Bernard Gert: *Wittgenstein and Logical Positivism.*

Robert R. Ammerman: *Wittgenstein's Later Methods.*

Douglas Berggren: *Language Games and Symbolic Forms.*

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (Chairman, Leroy E. Loemker)

George L. Kline: *Ethical Theory in Russian Marxism.*

Commentator: Mary-Barbara Zeldin.

Bernard Baumrin: *Without the Mind in Berkeley.*

Commentator: D. C. Yalden-Thomson.

Stanley G. French: *Hume's Hurdle.*

Commentator: Charles Fritz.

GROUP MEETINGS

Wednesday, December 27

(Morning)

SOCIETY FOR CREATIVE ETHICS (Chairman, William S. Minor)

John W. Davis: *Is Philosophy a Therapy or a Sickness?*

Commentators: Charles W. Kegley, Herbert J. Murray, Jr., Thomas R.

Bennett, John Herman Randall, Jr.

PEIRCE SOCIETY

Richard S. Robbin: *Critical Common-Sensism.*

Donald D. Roberts: *Existential Graphs.*

(Evening)

SOCIETY FOR ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY

Harold T. H. Reiche: *Xenophanes and the Axiomatization of the God-Concept.*

Audrey N. M. Rich: *Body and Soul in the Philosophy of Plotinus.*

ASSOCIATION FOR REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

John W. Lenz: *The New Naturalism in Ethics.*

PERSONALISTIC DISCUSSION GROUP (Chairman, Richard M. Millard)

Peter A. Bertocci: *In Defense of Metaphysical Creation.*

Commentator: George B. Burch.

The annual Business Meeting was called to order by President Carl G. Hempel at 11:10 a.m., Thursday, December 28.

Professor Hempel noted that the omission of Professor Scheffler's name on the Program Committee in the 1960-1961 *Proceedings* would be corrected in the 1961-1962 volume. It was then voted that the minutes of the fifty-seventh annual

PROCEEDINGS

Business Meeting, as printed in the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 1960-1961, be approved.

Memorial Minutes were read for C. Hillis Kaiser and Carl Frederick Tausch, and notice was given by Professor Hempel of the Memorial Minute read for George Holland Sabine at the 1961 meeting of the Western Division and included in the *Proceedings* for 1960-1961. Arriving too late for reading, the Memorial Minute for Howard J. B. Ziegler is here included.

Members rose and observed a moment of silence.

The following report of the Treasurer was read and approved.

TREASURER'S REPORT

December 2, 1960-December 1, 1961

A. Receipts:

Balance on Hand December 2, 1960:	
Savings Account	\$2303.62
Commercial Account	1998.49
	<hr/>
	4302.11
Receipts, December 2, 1960-December 1, 1961, Dues	
and Royalties	3541.85
	<hr/>
Total Financial Resources	7843.96

B. Expenditures (Commercial Account only):

Dues to National Association	\$2105.77
Publications	500.00
Expenses of 1960 Annual Meeting	181.06
Committee and Officers' Expenses	285.81
Office expenses	931.59
Secretarial help	510.00
Miscellaneous bank charges	38.68
Refunds	4.00
	<hr/>

Total Expenditures

\$4556.91

C. Summary of year's transactions in Commercial Account:

Balance December 1, 1960	-1998.49
Receipts December 2, 1960-December 1, 1961	3541.85
	<hr/>

Total

-5540.34

D. Balance on hand December 1, 1961:

Savings Account	\$2303.62
Commercial Account (assets less expenditures)	983.43
	<hr/>

Total

\$3287.05

The sum of \$84.18 was deposited resulting in the new total of \$1067.61 for December 2.

Since at \$2100 the Eastern Division's contribution to the National Association was the largest expenditure, queries concerning the reduction of this amount arose from the floor.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Professor John Wild presented the report of the Nominating Committee. The Committee presented the following nominations:

For President, Maurice Mandelbaum; for Vice-President, Roderick Chisholm; for members of the Executive Committee (to replace the two members whose terms expire December, 1961) John Ladd and Francis H. Parker. It was moved and seconded that the above officers be elected unanimously. Motion carried.

Professor Charles A. Baylis reported for the Publications Committee. He read a statement, to be published in the *Journal of Philosophy*, calling to the attention of Association members the Committee's "readiness to assist with the publication of high quality book or monograph-length manuscripts (excluding doctoral dissertations) which make original contributions to philosophy." Noting that in 1961-1962 the Eastern Division would be asked to contribute to the Committee only half as much as in the preceding year, Professor Baylis moved that the Eastern Division make a grant to the Committee on Publications. Due to the precarious financial situation of the Division, the exact amount, not exceeding \$250 was to be left to the discretion of the Executive Committee. Motion seconded and carried.

Professor Lionel Ruby reported for the Committee on Information Service. He noted the steady increase in the activities of the Committee, and encouraged professors emeriti to register with the Committee.

Professor Hempel announced the appointment of the following Program Committee for the 1962 meeting: Professor Wilfrid Sellars, Chairman; Professor Scheffler (continuing member from the previous committee); Professors Sachs and Rescher, new members; and the President and Secretary *ex officio*.

The motion made and seconded at the 1961 meeting, to amend the constitutional definition of *emeritus* to "that of a member in good standing in the Association for three years before attainment of emeritus status" was discussed. Motion carried.

Under new business, the following items were discussed:

A motion was made by Professors Nahm and Garvin that the nominations for election to membership approved by the Executive Committee be accepted. Motion carried. The following nominations were thus approved: for full membership, R. J. Ackermann, F. J. Adelman, H. A. Bedau, P. Benacerraf, I. Block, B. Brooke-Wavell, J. Burr, R. Coburn, G. Dalcourt, D. Deutsch, W. F. Edwards, L. H. Ehrlich, R. M. Gale, K. Gallagher, J. H. Glasse, H. Hiz, T. J. Howell, W. A. Johnson, J. A. Jordan, C. H. Kahn, I. Levi, E. Luschei, E. MacCormac, J. A. Mann, M. Miller, F. Molina, W. Morris, J. S. Murphy, J. Narveson, J. Needleman, J. O'Brien, A. Rorty, L. Rose, R. Santoni, R. A. Smyth, H. E. Smokler, F. Sontag, P. Talbutt, E. J. Trant, D. T. Wiecek; for associate membership, W. Anderson, M. R. Barral, M. Brown, D. E. Burrington, A. DiLascia, F. R. Harrison, H. Heidelberger, R. E. Hutcheson, M. Katz, J. Klaus, E. R. Lucas, E. F. McClennen, T. Messenger, P. Monsma, U. J. Olscamp, R. Rubenstein, M. Schagrin, J. P. Stewart, S. M. Weissman, H. Winfield, W. Wisdom.

Professor Hempel, at the suggestion of the Executive Committee, proposed that a committee be set up to review late applications (that is, those received through January 10, 1962), and to admit the applicants, provisionally, to the status of full or associate memberships, as the Committee might see fit, subject to the approval of the membership at the 1962 Business Meeting. Professor Morrow so moved. Motion seconded and carried.

PROCEEDINGS

Professor Hempel announced that, because some questions have arisen concerning the policies governing admission to full and associate membership, the Executive Committee had requested that he appoint a committee to review admission policies. Professor Hempel stated that he planned to appoint such a committee, which would report at the 1962-1963 meeting.

Professor Hempel asked for nominations for the Nominating Committee. The following nominations were made from the floor: Professors Richard Hocking, Charles Baylis, and John Smith. It was moved and seconded that the nominations be closed. Motion carried.

Professor Hempel recalled that Professor John Irving had given notice at the 1960 meeting of his intention to make a motion at the 1961 Business Meeting with regard to the office of the Secretary-Treasurer. Professor Hempel then called upon Professor Irving, who moved that the Eastern Division appoint a part-time paid Secretary-Treasurer whose duties should begin January 1, 1963, in lieu of the present arrangements. Professor Irving then spoke in behalf of his motion. Protracted discussion followed. Professor Tomas then moved that Professor Irving's motion be changed to read: "... a part-time paid assistant to the Secretary-Treasurer." Professor William Weedon moved that because of the various complicating factors, the President be empowered to appoint a committee to study the matter and to report to the Executive Committee and the Business Meeting of the Association. More discussion from the floor followed. Professor Hempel then called for a vote on the three motions. Professor Weedon's motion was lost; Professor Tomas' motion to amend Professor Irving's motion carried; and Professor Irving's motion, as amended, carried.

Professor Smith moved that a vote of thanks be given to the Arrangements Committee under Professor Nelson Goodman and to the Program Committee under Professor Monroe Bearsdsley. Motion seconded and carried.

The meeting was then adjourned.

ELIZABETH F. FLOWER, *Secretary-Treasurer*

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE EASTERN DIVISION

Financial Statement: December 2, 1961-June 30, 1962

Receipts:

Balance on hand December 2, 1961	
Savings Account	\$2303.62
Commercial Account	1067.61
Total	3371.23
Receipts, December 2, 1961-June 30, 1962	
Dues and Other	4358.73
Total Financial Resources	7729.96

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Expenditures:

Office expenses and secretarial help	\$ 723.78
Bank charges	50.65
Committee and officers' expenses	218.38
National Secretary (National dues, etc.)	1000.00
1961 Annual Meeting	1109.15
Total	3101.96

Balance on hand June 30, 1962:

Savings Account	\$2303.62
Commercial Account (Assets less expenditures)	2324.38
Total	4628.00

ELIZABETH F. FLOWERS, *Secretary-Treasurer*

WESTERN DIVISION

NEWLY ELECTED OFFICERS FOR 1962-1963

President—Herbert Feigl

Vice-President—Henry S. Leonard

Secretary-Treasurer—Ruth Barcan Marcus

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and Robert J. Henle (1963), Gustav Bergmann (1964), and Arthur W. Burks (1965).

OFFICERS FOR 1961-62

President—Charles L. Stevenson

Vice-President—Herbert Feigl

Secretary-Treasurer—Ruth Barcan Marcus

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and W. Donald Oliver (1962), Robert J. Henle (1963), and Gustav Bergmann (1964).

PROGRAM

Wayne State University was host to the sixtieth annual meeting of the Western Division, American Philosophical Association, held May 3-5, 1962, at Wayne State University and the Park Shelton Hotel, Detroit, Michigan.

The following program was presented:

Thursday, May 3

(Morning Session)

THE WESTERN CONFERENCE ON THE TEACHING OF PHILOSOPHY

Cecil H. Miller, Kansas State University, Chairman

PROCEEDINGS

Regionalism and the Teaching of Philosophy

George Kimball Plochmann, Southern Illinois University

The Teaching of Philosophy in Canada

John A. Irving, Victoria College, University of Toronto

Philosophy and Philosophy Teaching in Yugoslavia

Gajo Petrovic, University of Zagreb

The Philosophy Pedagogue—Teacher or Preacher

A. C. Benjamin, University of Missouri

On Teaching Ethics at the High School Level

Willis Moore, Southern Illinois University

(Evening)

Joint Program of THE SOCIETY FOR THE PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, THE PERSONALIST GROUP, and THE SOCIETY FOR CREATIVE ETHICS

WILLIAM S. MINOR, West Virginia University, Chairman

Symposium: ETHICS AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

A Critique of Marxist Ethics

Frederick W. McConnell, Moravian College

Determinism and Ethical Practice in Marxism

John Somerville, Hunter College

Philosophy, Marxism, and Mental Health

Howard L. Parsons, Coe College

Marxist Humanism and Ethics

Mihailo Markovic, Belgrade University, President of the Yugoslav Philosophical Association

Thursday, May 3

(Afternoon Concurrent Sessions)

Symposium: DEFINITIONS, POSTULATES, AND MODAL LOGIC. Arthur

W. Burks, University of Michigan, Chairman

Henry S. Leonard, Michigan State University

Richard Martin, University of Texas

Nicholas Rescher, University of Pittsburgh

Symposium: PLATO: DEGREES OF REALITY. Alan Gewirth, University of Chicago, Chairman

Gregory Vlastos, Princeton University

Julius Moravcsik, University of Michigan

Reginald Allen, University of Minnesota

CRITERIA AND PARADIGM CASES. William Alston, University of Michigan, Chairman

Albritton on 'Criterion'

Newton Garver, University of Buffalo

Discussion by Keith Lehrer, Wayne State University

Pretending To Be In Pain

Frederick A. Siegler, University of Chicago

Discussion by Gerald Myers, Kenyon College

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Some Paradigm Case Arguments in Plato

John King-Farlow and J. M. Rothstein, Amherst College

Discussion by Peter Diamadopoulos, University of Maryland

ETHICS. Morris Keeton, Antioch College, Chairman

Moral Beliefs and Attitudes

Mendel F. Cohen, Cornell University

Discussion by Joseph Margolis, University of Cincinnati

Self-Evidence, Relevance and Moral Knowledge

Edmund L. Pincoffs, University of Houston

Discussion by Carl Ginet, The Ohio State University

'Range' Rules in Moral Contexts

Nicholas Fotion, Coe College

Discussion by William Sacksteder, University of Colorado

(Evening)

ANNUAL SMOKER

Friday, May 4

(Morning Concurrent Sessions)

Symposium: *WITTGENSTEIN: TRACTATUS*. O. K. Bouwsma, University of Nebraska, Chairman

Erik Stenius, University of Abo, Finland

Irving Copi, University of Michigan

Edwin B. Allaire, State University of Iowa

Symposium: *POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY*. Wayne A. R. Leys, Roosevelt University, Chairman

Charner Perry, University of Chicago

Richard Brandt, Swarthmore College

Douglas Morgan, University of Texas

LOGIC. Arthur Smullyan, University of Washington, Chairman

Propositional Logic of Paul of Pergola

Ivan Boh, Clarke College

Discussion by Otto Bird, University of Notre Dame

Uninterpreted Calculi and 'Sound' Logical Systems

Richard B. Angell, Ohio Wesleyan University

Discussion by William Todd, Northwestern University

HUME. Everett J. Nelson, The Ohio State University, Chairman

Hume's Principles

John W. Yolton, University of Maryland

Discussion by Julius Weinberg, University of Wisconsin

A Refutation of the Humean Analysis of Causality

John O. Nelson, University of Colorado

Discussion by Peter James Caws, University of Kansas

CULTURE AND ACTION. Frederick L. Will, University of Illinois, Chairman

Professor Leslie White on Man and Culture

Richard G. Henson, University of Utah

Discussion by John R. Silber, University of Texas

PROCEEDINGS

Interpersonal and Physical Causation

Roger Hancock, University of Chicago

Discussion by Wesley Salmon, Brown University

(Afternoon Concurrent Sessions)

Symposium: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RESPONSIBILITY. A. C. Garnett,

University of Wisconsin, Chairman

John Wild, Northwestern University

William Frankena, University of Michigan

George A. Schrader, Yale University

Symposium: QUALIFIED INDETERMINISM. Vincent Anthony Tomas, Brown University, Chairman

Arthur N. Prior, University of Manchester

Alan R. Anderson, Yale University, and J. B. Schneewind, Yale University

Mary Mothersill, College of the City of New York

METAPHYSICS AND METAPHOR. William Earle, Northwestern University, Chairman

Real and More Real

George I. Mavrodes, Princeton University

Discussion by Alan Pasch, University of Maryland

On Metaphorical Expression

James M. Edie, Northwestern University

Discussion by Frithjof H. Bergmann, University of Michigan

Metaphysical, Metaphorical and Secondary Use of Language

James D. Carney, Kenyon College

Discussion by Bruce Arthur Aune, Oberlin College

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Herbert Feigl, University of Minnesota, Chairman

The Causal Efficacy of Space

Dudley Shapere, University of Chicago

Discussion by Paul McEvoy, Indiana University

Are There H-Explanations?

Bernard Baumrin, University of Delaware

Discussion by Sylvain Bromberger, University of Chicago

Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretation

Peter Achinstein, State University of Iowa

Discussion by Leo Simons, University of Tennessee

RECEPTION. Winfred A. Harbison, Vice-President for Academic Administration

(Evening)

ANNUAL DINNER. Toastmaster: Herbert Feigl, University of Minnesota

Words of Welcome: Winfred A. Harbison, Vice-President for Academic Administration

Presidential Address: *Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value*

Charles L. Stevenson, University of Michigan

Saturday, May 5

(Morning Concurrent Sessions)

Symposium: THOUGHT AND ACTION. Charles L. Stevenson, University of

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Michigan, Chairman

Alan Donagan, Indiana University

David Falk, Wayne State University

Vere Chappell, University of Chicago

Symposium: TEMPORALLY-ASYMMETRIC PRINCIPLES, PARITY BETWEEN EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION, AND MECHANISM VERSUS TELEOLOGY. George Nakhnikian, Wayne State University, Chairman

Adolph Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh

Richard Rudner, Michigan State University

Stephen F. Barker, University of Virginia

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. Charles H. Patterson, University of Nebraska, Chairman

Bliks, Significance and Support

William H. Baumer, University of North Dakota

Discussion by Gareth B. Matthews, University of Minnesota

Did God Create the Only Possible World?

J. F. Ross, University of Pennsylvania

Discussion by Thomas Donald Langan, Indiana University

Tillich On the Existence of God

William L. Rowe, University of Illinois

Discussion by Marvin Fox, The Ohio State University

HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. William H. Hay, University of Wisconsin, Chairman

Hobbes and Psychological Egoism

Bernard Gert, Dartmouth College

Discussion by Theodore Waldman, Arizona State University

Perceptual Relativity and Ideas in the Mind

P. D. Cummins, Washington University

Discussion by Willis Doney, Dartmouth College

The Epistemological Breakdown of Cartesian Metaphysics

Richard A. Watson, University of Michigan

Discussion by Norman Kretzmann, The Ohio State University

The annual business meeting of the Western Division was called to order at 10:50 a.m. on May 4, by President Charles Stevenson.

It was moved, seconded, and unanimously agreed that the minutes of the 1961 meeting be approved as printed in the *Proceedings*.

The report of the Treasurer was distributed.

TREASURER'S REPORT

May 1, 1961 through April 30, 1962

I. Regular Account

A. Receipts

Balance on hand from April 30, 1961.....	\$ 563.36
Dues collected May 1 to April 30.....	2,420.00
Subscriptions to literature.....	28.00
Balance from Committee to Advance Original Work....	26.40

PROCEEDINGS

Sales of <i>Philosophy and the Public Interest</i>	29.00	
Refund from <i>Newsletter</i>	8.34	
		\$3,075.10

B. Disbursements

<i>Newsletter</i>	\$ 349.00	
Annual meeting expenses	200.00	
Committee on Information Service	126.10	
National and International Dues	355.80	
<i>Proceedings</i>	722.95	
Payment on Debt for Committee to Advance		
Original Work	255.87	
Program, 1962 Annual Meeting		
Program Committee Expenses	53.77	
Programs Printed	274.37	
Office of Secretary-Treasurer of the Division		
Secretary's Travel	55.91	
Postage, Telephone, Telegraph, and		
Railway Express	62.71	
Supplies and Services (including		
pre-stamped envelopes)	282.26	
Bank Services	5.22	
		\$2,901.63
BALANCE ON HAND, April 30, 1962		\$ 173.47

II. Fund held for Committee on Philosophy in Education

Balance on hand, June 30, 1961	\$ 207.34	
<i>Disbursements</i>	000.00	
		\$ 207.34
BALANCE ON HAND, April 30, 1962		\$ 207.34

RUTH BARCAN MARCUS, *Treasurer*

The Chairman of the Auditing Committee, Robert Browning (the Committee consisted of himself and Arthur Burks), reported that the books of the Division had been examined; income, deposits, and expenditures reviewed and compared with bank records, and were found to be exact. It was moved, seconded, and passed unanimously that the report of the auditors' and the Treasurer's Report be approved.

William Frankena read a memorial minute concerning Paul Henle. The Secretary read a memorial minute written by Merrill R. Murray concerning Richard N. Kramer. W. N. Sibley read a memorial minute concerning Rupert C. Lodge. It was moved that these minutes be printed in the PROCEEDINGS and was adopted by a rising vote.

The Secretary presented the recommendation of the Executive Committee concerning new memberships and advancements from associate to full membership. Upon motion by Douglas Morgan, which was seconded and unanimously approved, memberships were granted as follows:

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Michigan, Chairman

Alan Donagan, Indiana University

David Falk, Wayne State University

Vere Chappell, University of Chicago

Symposium: TEMPORALLY-ASYMMETRIC PRINCIPLES, PARITY BETWEEN EXPLANATION AND PREDICTION, AND MECHANISM VERSUS TELEOLOGY. George Nakhnikian, Wayne State University, Chairman

Adolph Grünbaum, University of Pittsburgh

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William Frankena read a memorial minute concerning Paul Henle. The Secretary read a memorial minute written by Merrill R. Murray concerning Richard N. Kramer. W. N. Sibley read a memorial minute concerning Rupert C. Lodge. It was moved that these minutes be printed in the PROCEEDINGS and was adopted by a rising vote.

The Secretary presented the recommendation of the Executive Committee concerning new memberships and advancements from associate to full membership. Upon motion by Douglas Morgan, which was seconded and unanimously approved, memberships were granted as follows:

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

FULL MEMBERS: Edwin B. Allaire, Otto A. Bird, Francis G. Bayley, Frithjof H. Bergmann, Richard J. Blackwell, Jovan Brkic, Sylvain Bromberger, Donald R. Burrill, John V. Canfield, John Carnes, Ramona T. Cormier, Phillip D. Cummins, Frederick I. Dretske, Berkley B. Eddins, Willard O. Eddy, William J. Emblom, Alden L. Fisher, Sister Marie Gabriel, Donald F. Gustafson, Robert L. Holmes, Berel Lang, Gerald MacCallum, Truman Madson, Gareth B. Matthews, Milton Mayeroff, Henry E. McLane, Jr., Daniel D. Merrill, Ralph V. Norman, Jr., James R. Pratt, Claude H. Prevots, Leon J. Putnam, John A. Robinson, William L. Rowe, Kenneth L. Schmitz, Sid B. Thomas, Jr., Richard A. Watson.

ASSOCIATE MEMBER: Byung Uk Ahn, Jules Belford, Paul D. Brewer, Rev. William H. Crilly, Kenneth D. Freeman, George H. Hampsch, Russell L. Jaberg, John Kozy, Jr., J. Frederick Logan, George M. Luckey, Jr., Paul P. McEvoy, William J. Maroldo, Robert K. Merritt, George W. Miller, Robert B. Moore, P. Ramakrishna, Ronald E. Roblin, Alan Shavzin, John D. Sommer, Paul R. Sponheim, Ira S. Steinberg, Marjorie Weinzwieg, Robert E. Willis, Daniel W. Wynn.

ADVANCED FROM ASSOCIATE TO FULL MEMBERSHIPS: Tad S. Clements, Charles J. Ping, Walter A. Stromseth.

Virgil C. Aldrich reported for the Committee on Publications. He moved that the Division grant \$100.00 to the Committee for 1962-1963. The motion was seconded and approved unanimously.

Lionel Ruby presented a report on the work of the Committee on Information.

Richard McKeon read the report of the Committee on International Cultural Cooperation.

Wayne A. R. Leys reported for the national Committee to Advance Original Work in Philosophy (published in a preceding section of the *Proceedings*).

A report of the Carus Lectures Committee was presented by Charner Perry. The membership was informed that the 1963 Carus Lectures will be delivered by Ernest Nagel at the annual meeting of the Western Division.

The President reported for the Executive Committee its appreciation for the work of John McKenney as Editor of the *Newsletter*. McKenney was applauded for his work. On the recommendation of the Executive Committee, it was moved, seconded, and passed unanimously that the *Newsletter* be provided with a budget of \$400.00 for the year 1962-1963.

On recommendation of the Executive Committee, it was proposed that the by-law concerning the composition of the Nominating Committee be changed from: "The retiring President shall appoint a Nominating Committee which shall consist of: One past president of the Division; the current Secretary-Treasurer; the newest member of the Executive Committee; and a fifth and sixth member not falling in any one of the above categories." to "The retiring President shall appoint a Nominating Committee which shall consist of: One past president of the Division; the current Secretary-Treasurer; the newest member of the Executive Committee; and a fourth and fifth member not falling in any one of the above categories." It was moved, seconded, and unanimously agreed that the by-law be changed as stated.

The Executive Committee reported that Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, had extended an invitation for next year's meeting. It was moved, sec-

PROCEEDINGS

onded, and enthusiastically agreed that the invitation be accepted.

O. K. Bouwsma, Chairman of the Nominating Committee, which consisted of himself, Gustav Bergmann, William Frankena, Ruth Barcan Marcus, and George Nakhnikian, presented his report. Nominated for Vice-President were Henry Leonard and Frederick Will; for member of the Executive Committee, Arthur Burks. It was moved, seconded, and passed that nominations be closed. It was also moved, seconded, and passed that the nominee for the Executive Committee be unanimously approved. Tellers Vincent Tomas and Douglas Morgan after collecting and tallying the ballots reported that Henry Leonard was elected Vice-President for 1962-1963, to succeed the following year to the Presidency.

President-Elect Feigl was presented by the Chairman. Feigl announced the appointment of the following committees for 1962-1963. Program Committee—George Nakhnikian, Chairman; William Alston, and Ruth Barcan Marcus. Nominating Committee—Charles Stevenson, Chairman; Arthur Burks, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Burnham Terrell, and Henry Veatch.

At the suggestion of the Chairman, it was moved, seconded, and unanimously agreed that the Secretary be thanked for her efforts.

The Chairman of the Resolutions Committee, Richard McKeon (the other members being Morris Keeton and Douglas Morgan), read the following resolution which was approved with applause: "The formalities of propriety often express the materials of enjoyment felicitously. I move that the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association express this substantiality of appreciation to Wayne State University, to the Department of Philosophy at Wayne State University, and to the Detroit Philosophical Society, for preparing all the conditions requisite for philosophical discussion, including perspectives of beauty in academic halls and gardens."

The meeting was then adjourned.

RUTH BARCAN MARCUS, *Secretary-Treasurer*

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE WESTERN DIVISION

May 1-June 30, 1962

I. Regular Report

A. Receipts:

Balance from April 30, 1962	\$173.47
Dues received May 1 to June 30	425.00
Literature fees	8.00
Sales of <i>Philosophy and the Public Interest</i>	5.00
Refund from sale of <i>Proceedings</i>	135.98
Detroit Philosophical Association	67.50
TOTAL RECEIPTS	\$814.95

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

B. Disbursements:

Newsletter	\$ 50.00
Secretary's Travel	86.47
Annual Meeting Expenses	89.37
Program Committee Expense	5.00
Supplies (printing of letterhead)	29.25
Postage and Telephone	15.95
Bank Services40

TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS	\$276.44
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BALANCE ON HAND, June 30, 1962	\$538.51
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II. Fund Held for Committee on Philosophy in Education

BALANCE ON HAND, June 30, 1962 (at Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio, in the name of the Treasurer of the Western Division, Ruth Barcan Marcus)	\$207.34
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RUTH BARCAN MARCUS, *Treasurer*

PACIFIC DIVISION

NEWLY ELECTED OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1961-62

President—Isabel Hungerland

Vice-President—Donald Davidson

Secretary-Treasurer—Sidney Zink

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and Benson Mates (1962), Richard Henson (1963), Donald Kalish (1963), and A. I. Melden (*ex officio*).

OFFICERS FOR THE YEAR 1960-61

President—A. I. Melden

Vice President—Robert M. Yost, Jr.

Secretary-Treasurer—Sidney Zink

Executive Committee—The foregoing officers and Ian McGreal (1961), Avrum Stroll (1961), Benson Mates (1962) and Barnett Savery (*ex-officio*)

PROGRAM

The thirty-fifth Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Vancouver, Vancouver, British Columbia, on August 30, 31, and September 1, 1961.

Wednesday, August 30

SECTION A. Chairman, Winfield E. Nagley

PROCEEDINGS

Hedonism in the Protagoras, Alexander Sesonske

Morality Pills, Wallace I. Matson

On Exemption From Moral Blame, Arnold S. Kaufman

SECTION B. Chairman, Desmond Fitzgerald

Value Realization and Value Judgment, Warner Monroe

"Community" As A Normative Concept, Melvin Rader

Disagreement in Attitude, V. J. McGill

(Plenary Session)

CARUS LECTURE: *CONCEPT AND QUALITY*

I. *Introductory Considerations*, Stephen C. Pepper

Thursday, August 31

(Morning)

Chairman, John Goldthwait

Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation, Paul D. Wienpahl

Arthur Schopenhauer: A Clue to the Riddle

of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Fred Hagen

(Plenary Session)

CARUS LECTURES: *CONCEPT AND QUALITY*

II. *An Overall View of the Hypothesis*, Stephen C. Pepper

Chairman, Karl Aschenbrenner

Intending the Impossible, Irving Thalberg

Reasons and Causes, Donald Davidson

Reasons and Causes, Daniel Bennett

(Plenary Session)

CARUS LECTURES: *CONCEPT AND QUALITY*

III. *Disposition—an Application*, Stephen C. Pepper

COCKTAIL PARTY

(Evening)

BANQUET

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS:

Reasons for Action and Matters of Fact, A. I. Melden

Friday, September 1

(Morning)

BUSINESS MEETING

(Concurrent Sessions)

SECTION A. Chairman, Charles Chihara

Is Existence a Predicate?, Murray Kiteley

Some Simplifications in the Logic of Quantifiers and the

Techniques of Natural Deduction, David W. Bennett

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

On Indeterminate Conditionals, Richard C. Jeffrey

SECTION B. Chairman, V. J. McGill

Two Apothegms, Mary Mothersill

Theological Arguments and Motives, Catherine D. Rau

Epistemology and Ordinary Language, Robert C. Caldwell

The annual business meeting of the Pacific Division was held on September 1, at 9:00 a.m., President A. I. Melden presiding.

The following report of the Secretary-Treasurer was read and approved:

FINANCIAL STATEMENT: July 1, 1960 to June 30, 1961

Receipts:

Balance on hand, July 1, 1960	\$ 502.17
Membership dues	1,070.67
Rebate from sales of <i>Proceedings</i>	29.04
	\$1,601.88

Expenditures:

Office expenses	\$ 48.59
Stenographic service	216.25
Expenses, Secretary-Treasurer	16.00
Program, 1960 annual meeting	49.97
National Committee on Information Service	54.12
<i>Proceedings</i>	316.71
National dues	124.00
International dues	24.80
	850.44
<i>Balance on hand, June 30, 1961</i>	\$ 751.44

DONALD DAVISON, *Secretary-Treasurer*

This statement has been audited and certified to be correct by Sidney Zink.

The place and time of the next meeting was set as the University of California, Berkeley, California, December 27, 28, and 29, 1962.

The following persons were elected to full membership in the Division: Zygmunt Adamczewski, Edward J. Bond, Orville Conner, Haldor C. Karason, Murray J. Kiteley, Edward J. Machle, and Patrick T. Mackenzie.

The following persons were transferred from associate to full membership: Charles Chihara and Robert J. Fogelin.

The following person was elected to associate membership:
Thomas E. Smith.

The members expressed their regret at the recent deaths of Professors G. P. Adams, R. T. Flewelling, and Hunter Mead. Professors Pepper, Searles, and Bures were requested to prepare notices for each of these for the Memorial Minutes of the next issue of *Proceedings*.

The following motion was presented by Professor James L. Jarrett and was passed by the members:

"Whereas the formal study of Philosophy under the tutelage of professional philosophers constitutes an indispensable part of liberal education, and whereas

PROCEEDINGS

such study, not by any means alone in the special discipline of Philosophy of Education, but also in Logic, Ethics, Epistemology, and History of Philosophy, and other courses, has an especial importance in the education of teachers for every level, be it resolved that the administrators and faculties of those institutions which are active in the preparation of teachers for the schools be continually reminded of the importance of adequately trained teachers of philosophy on their staffs and of a liberal offering of fundamental Philosophy courses in their curricula, and be it further resolved that the office of Information Services of the American Philosophical Association be earnestly requested to take immediate steps toward appraising colleges and universities throughout the United States and Canada of the help which this agency is prepared to offer in securing the professional services of teachers of philosophy."

Professor Lewis Hahn discussed motion 60-3 which was passed by the National Board of Officers on July 1, 1960 and recommended that the Pacific Division give its approval to the motion, which authorizes the Board to request the International Federation of Philosophical Societies to allow the American Philosophical Association to hold its membership in the Federation as three bodies (Eastern, Western, and Pacific) instead of one body as is presently the case. This recommendation was adopted, and the Executive Committee was instructed to take any necessary actions pertaining to the Board's request.

Professor John Irving discussed a proposal which is under consideration by the Eastern Division to appoint a secretary-treasurer of the division who will be a paid employee and not a member of the association. It was pointed out by Professor Irving that the amount of work with which the secretary-treasurer of the Eastern Division is now burdened is very great, and that this new measure is therefore desirable. The proposal was discussed, but no motion was offered and no action taken.

Professor Karl Aschenbrenner suggested that summaries of papers be required of those submitting papers and that these be either distributed to all members in advance of the meeting or circulated at the meeting. In the ensuing discussion it was suggested instead that persons submitting papers prepare them with a view to the difficulties of comprehending a version presented orally.

Professor Frank Seaman proposed that the Division adopt a resolution similar to that adopted by the Western Division objecting to the disclaimer oath required by the persons granted fellowships under the National Defense Act. After discussion a motion was passed that the Division opposes in principle the requirement of the disclaimer oath, that such a resolution be formulated by the Executive Committee of the Division, and that information of this action be forwarded to the proper authority.

The following motion was accordingly drafted:

"Whereas the disclaimer affidavit required by the National Defense Education Act of all students receiving benefits under said act brings the internal beliefs of citizens under the scrutiny of civil government and the criminal law contrary to our traditions of freedom of conscience and its legal guarantees, and

"Whereas the disclaimer assumes that an ambiguous overt act is, without further evidence, proof of disloyalty and therefore decisive in depriving citizens of common benefits, and

"Whereas the exaction of the disclaimer from one group of citizens as a

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

condition of enjoying common benefits of law is discriminatory,

"The Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association meeting at the University of British Columbia, September 1, 1961

1) records its opposition in principle to this provision of the National Defense Education Act and

2) respectfully requests the Congress of the United States to repeal this provision."

Professor Savery proposed that the Executive Committee be authorized to pay the expenses of a distinguished visitor to deliver a paper at the next annual meeting. A motion to this effect was passed.

The following list of officers was nominated by the Executive Committee, and all were elected unanimously by the members: President, Isabel Hungerland; Vice-President, Donald Davidson; new members to the Executive Committee, Richard Henson and Donald Kalish; and Whitaker Deininger, Information Service Officer for the Division.

By unanimous vote the Division expressed deep appreciation for the warm hospitality of the administration and the Department of Philosophy of the University of British Columbia on the occasion of its thirty-fifth Annual Meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 9:50 a.m.

SIDNEY ZINK, *Secretary-Treasurer*

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE TREASURER OF THE PACIFIC DIVISION

Financial Statement: July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1962

Receipts:

Balance on hand, July 1, 1961.....	\$ 682.40
Membership dues	1,299.50
Rebate from sales of <i>Proceedings</i>	61.46
	<hr/>
	\$1,981.90

Expenditures:

Office expenses	\$ 86.84
Stenographic service	149.30
Program, 1961 annual meeting.....	56.16
Expenses, 1961 annual meeting	121.63
<i>Proceedings</i> , Volume XXXIV.....	326.73
Committee on Information Service.....	56.99
National dues	134.00
International dues	26.80
	<hr/>
	\$958.45
<i>Balance on hand, June 30, 1962</i>	<hr/>
	\$1,023.45

SIDNEY ZINK, *Secretary-Treasurer*

MEMORIAL MINUTES

GEORGE PLIMPTON ADAMS

1882-1961

With deep regret the American Philosophical Association learns of the death of George Plimpton Adams, of the University of California, Berkeley. He was one of the small group most influential in bringing about the organization of the Pacific Division in 1924, and throughout the years since has been a prominent figure in its annual sessions. He was President of the Pacific Division in 1927, his presidential address being entitled, "Immediacy and Meaning."

His principal writings consisted of two books, *Idealism and the Modern Age*, 1919, and *Man and Metaphysics*, 1948, and a succession of important articles on a wide range of philosophical subjects that appeared from 1910 through 1957 in the *University of California Publications in Philosophy*. These are notable for imaginative breadth, and human concern, and an extraordinary sweep of scholarship. They represent a period of far reaching curiosity and interest in all fields of scientific and historical accomplishment, and of vigorous endeavor to see things as a whole.

He was born in Northboro, Massachusetts, on October 7, 1882, the youngest of six children. His father being a New England minister, he was brought up in an atmosphere that cultivated intellectual ideals. He was sent for his college preparation to one of the most advanced schools of the time, Lewis Institute in Chicago. There he became ready for college so early that his father sent him for a year to a crafts institute to learn carpentry. He was at Harvard during the great philosophical period there with James, Royce, Muensterberg, and Santayana. He received his A.B. in 1904 and his Ph.D., after some interruptions, in 1911. Between 1906-1908 he taught Psychology and Biology at Lewis Institute. In 1908 he married Mary Knowles Woodle. That same year he came to Berkeley as an Instructor in Philosophy. He climbed the rungs of the academic ladder rapidly becoming Professor in 1918. In 1932 he was appointed to the chair of Mills Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy and Civil Polity. He was honored in 1932 as Faculty Research Lecturer at Berkeley, in 1939 as Messenger Lecturer at Cornell, and in 1946 as Woodbridge Lecturer at Columbia. Later he was also invited to the Carus Lectureship, which unfortunately he was not able to accept. He became emeritus in 1954, at which time the University of California bestowed on him the honorary degree of L.L.D.

During his active period he was twice Dean of the College of Letters and Science (1917-1918, and 1943-1947). He was extremely influential in developing the democratic form of faculty participation in the academic government of the University, and by his personal integrity and force of character did much to

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

create the high morale and fair judicial attitude that has come to prevail in the committees in Berkeley. He was many times chairman on the important committees, and gave unstintingly of his time for such service to the University.

As a teacher he will be long remembered by hundreds of students of all degrees of preparation. He was a stimulus alike to large classes of freshmen, and select seminars of graduate students. He was deeply respected on all sides. His influence has spread through his many students and his writings far across the country, and will continue for years to come.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

1871-1960

In the death of Ralph Tyler Flewelling the philosophical fraternity has lost one of its most honored and distinguished members. He was one of the founders of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association and was its president in 1935-36. Throughout a long career he remained actively interested in its affairs. Dr. Flewelling was an inspiring teacher, a sympathetic counselor, and an able and wise administrator. Thousands of his students will remember him with deep affection as an inspirer of youth, a challenger to independent thinking, and a possessor and advocate of broad humane learning. As long as he taught, he considered it a pleasure to offer at least one introductory course in which he could be the first to open up the magic doors of philosophy.

Ralph Tyler Flewelling was born November 23, 1871, in DeWitte, Michigan, and died in Los Angeles on March 31, 1960. He attended the University of Michigan from 1890-1892; received the A.B. from Alma College in 1895; the Ph.D. from Boston University School of Theology in 1909; the LL.D. from Boston University in 1931, and Litt.D. from the University of Southern California in 1945.

Dr. Flewelling served various Methodist churches in Massachusetts from 1900 until 1917 when he became Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. When the School of Philosophy was established, he became its Director and served in this capacity until his retirement in 1945. He served on the faculty of the American Expeditionary Force University at Beaune, France, in World War I. He was visiting professor at the California College in Peking, China, and lecturer in Yen Ching University in 1934-35, served on the organizing committee of the International Congress of Philosophy held in Paris in 1937, and inaugurated the Tulley Knowles lectures at the College of the Pacific in 1946. In 1950-52 he was visiting professor in the Claremont Men's College.

Among his major writings are: *Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy* (1915); *Bergson and Personal Idealism* (1920); *Creative Personality* (1926); *The Survival of Western Culture* (1943); *Conflict and Conciliation of Cultures* (1951); *The Person* (1952); and an autobiography published posthumously, *The Forest of Yggdrasil* (1962).

Ralph Tyler Flewelling in 1920 founded *The Personalist*, a journal of philosophy, religion, and literature, which he edited until 1959. The quality of his literary genius was perhaps nowhere better exhibited than in the feature which ran for forty years in *The Personalist* which he called "The Lantern of Diogenes."

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It consisted of topical commentary and observations ranging from the whimsical to the profound, revealing a sympathetic and catholic outlook on the universe, and at the same time a candid and penetrating wit.

He was the inspirational and driving force behind the founding of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California, and was instrumental in the securing of the funds for the construction of the Mudd Memorial Hall of Philosophy, where he built up a superb philosophical library. As an administrator he called to his department men of various philosophical persuasions and encouraged the free expression and exchange of diverse philosophical viewpoints.

Philosophically, Flewelling represented a trend in philosophy in opposition to much of the current analytic and positivistic thinking. He was broadly humanistic, theistic, and personalistic as against all absolutisms, mechanism, and reductionism. The key concept of his metaphysics is that of the essential irreducible uniqueness of the person. The person is the center of reality, and it is on the basis of this model that the Cosmos can be understood. The recognition of the supreme value of personality is a mandate to democracy and the source of ultimate world understanding.

He was able to achieve in his personal philosophy a remarkable reconciliation between a realistic appraisal of human finitude and a profound enthusiasm for human potentialities. In his work he strove to transcend the former in himself and liberate the latter in others.

HERBERT L. SEARLES

PAUL HENLE

1908-1962

On January 27, 1962, Paul Henle, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan, died in Paris while on sabbatical leave. By his death the American Philosophical Association has lost one of its outstanding members.

Professor Henle was born in New York City, September 12, 1908, but grew up in Cleveland, Ohio. He took his A.B. at Harvard, *magna cum laude*, in 1929. After a semester in the Harvard Law School, he returned to philosophy as a graduate student, also at Harvard, taking an M.A. in 1931 and a Ph.D. in 1933. His dissertation was in symbolic logic. In 1933, together with F. M. Chapman, he also published *Fundamentals of Logic*, one of the first modern elementary textbooks in logic.

Dr. Henle continued to serve as an assistant in philosophy at Harvard until the fall of 1934, when he became an instructor at Smith College. In 1936 he was made an assistant professor and in 1937 he came to the University of Michigan at that rank. In 1942 he married Jeanne M. LaForge. He also entered the army, in which he served for three years, the last in Europe as a cryptanalyst. In 1945 he returned to the University of Michigan, but in 1946 his career there was again interrupted. He was lured away by Northwestern University, where he held an associate professorship for four years. While there he was made chairman of his Department and went about rebuilding it with characteristic enthusiasm and success. He also held a Guggenheim Fellowship for the year 1948-49, which he spent at Harvard in research on the theory of meaning. In 1950 he was persuaded

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to return to the University of Michigan as a Professor of Philosophy, and remained until his death, except for a year in France as a Fulbright Research Professor (1954-55). He also taught one summer at Columbia and another at Harvard.

Professor Henle was a superb teacher in several branches of philosophy and at all levels, planning and executing his courses and lectures with the utmost care both for the subject and the student. His output of articles was not large, but it was steady, and added lustre to the profession. He was one of the editors of a volume of essays in honor of H. M. Sheffer, and the editor of *Language Thought and Culture* (1958), a volume which grew out of a cooperative study of language and symbolism carried out at the University of Michigan in 1951-52. To both volumes he contributed valuable essays. Professor Henle was also an active and respected member of both the Eastern and Western Divisions of the American Philosophical Association, reading and commenting on papers and serving on various committees. In 1953-54 he was president of the Western Division, having been vice-president the previous year, and the Division still shows the beneficial effects of his ministrations.

Professor Henle was an admirable and stimulating colleague, a trusted counselor, and a loyal friend. To many of us the Division will be different now that he is gone. He is survived by his wife, two sons, and two sisters.

WILLIAM FRANKENA

RICHARD NEIL KRAMER

1922-1961

Richard Neil Kramer was born at Peru, Indiana, July 5, 1922. He completed the A.B. degree at Indiana University in 1949 and continued on in graduate study completing the Master of Arts and Doctor of Philosophy degrees in 1951 and 1953 respectively. During his undergraduate and graduate study at the University he was an honor student, served a term as President of the Philosophy Club, and was awarded the Graduate Ewing Prize in Philosophy.

Dr. Kramer served as a Philosophy Lecturer and academic counselor at Indiana University, Indianapolis and Ft. Wayne Centers. He established and became Director of the General Education Program at Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana. At the time of his death he was a member of the faculty of the General Education Division, Ferris Institute, Big Rapids, Michigan. His widow and five young sons continue to reside in that community.

Professor Kramer was a quiet, humble man with simple personal needs and with no great desire for the material rewards of life. He possessed an insatiable appetite for discussing philosophically the concerns of life. His activities were directed toward the examination and re-examination of those elements and concerns which give meaning and direction to man's existence. An inspiring teacher, he successfully attempted to instill in his students the desire for learning and truth. He knew life from the savagery of the battlefield to the quiet solitude of the forest, and his view of life reflected those experiences. A potentially brilliant career has been prematurely terminated.

MERRILL R. MURRAY

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RUPERT CLENDON LODGE

1886-1960

Rupert Clendon Lodge, M.A., F.R.S.C., Professor Emeritus of the University of Manitoba, died in retirement on March 1, 1960, at St. Petersburg, Florida, in his 74th year.

A member of a distinguished British family, Professor Lodge was educated at the Manchester Grammar School and Brasenose College, Oxford, his career as a student being marked by a succession of high academic honors. His post-graduate studies (at the Universities of Marburg and Berlin) were interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War. From 1914 to 1920 he taught at the Universities of Dalhousie, Minnesota, and Alberta. In 1920 he was appointed Professor of Logic and the History of Philosophy in the University of Manitoba, and, with the late Professor H. W. Wright, Joint Head of the Department of Philosophy. From 1934, when a separate Department of Psychology was established in the University, until his retirement in 1947, Professor Lodge was Head of the Department of Philosophy. He received leave of absence on three occasions, to accept appointments as Visiting Lecturer in Harvard, and as Visiting Professor at the University of North Carolina and at New York University. After retiring from Manitoba, he acted as Head of the Department of Philosophy for one year at Queen's University, Ontario, and subsequently taught part-time at Long Island University in New York.

Professor Lodge was the author of a large number of articles, and of thirteen books. Three of these in particular became widely known: *Plato's Theory of Ethics*; *The Great Thinkers*; and *The Philosophy of Education*. His scholarly attainments were recognized by his election to the Royal Society of Canada, and to the Presidency of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, in 1926.

In his philosophizing, Professor Lodge recognized the possibility of three major modes of thought—Realism, Idealism, and Pragmatism—each of which had something distinctive to contribute to philosophical vision, and none of which could claim absolute supremacy over its rivals. The implications of these diverse views with respect to the great issues of philosophy were explored in several of his major works in accordance with this "comparative method," as he termed it. His own private allegiance, however, was given, as his method permitted, largely to one of these—the tradition of Idealism—and the philosopher with whom he felt the great sympathy and whose works he studied with especial care and interest, was Plato.

Professor Lodge was much more than a merely academic philosopher. He was a lively, stimulating, popular, and inspiring teacher. He was thoroughly versed in the classics; was widely read in History; and was an informed, enthusiastic, and accomplished musician. To the very end of his life, he was generous in his assistance to those who had fallen on difficult times: a fact not widely known, by reason of his preference, wherever possible, for secrecy and anonymity in his benefactions; but one which I think ought to be duly recorded here. For his qualities of mind and character, and for his contributions to his University and to philosophy, he is remembered with great affection and gratitude.

W. M. SIBLEY

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HUNTER MEAD

1907-1961

Hunter Mead, Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at California Institute of Technology, died July 2, 1961, following surgery for brain tumor.

Professor Mead was born April 1, 1907 in Sierra Madre, California. He received his B.A. degree from Pomona College, 1930, his M.A. degree from Claremont Graduate School, 1933, and his Ph.D. from the University of Southern California, 1936. After his B.A. degree he taught at the American Colleges in Smyrna and Salonica, 1930-32. Following his doctorate he taught in Los Angeles City College, 1939-1941, and San Diego State College, 1941-1947, before coming to California Institute in 1947.

Hunter Mead was widely known for his introductory text, *Types and Problems of Philosophy*, which went into three editions, 1946, 1953, 1959. He also wrote *An Introduction to Aesthetics*, 1951. These two titles indicate the two main concurrent phases of his cultural contribution, philosophy and music. Professor Mead was a fine lecturer and teacher, and he strongly influenced his students, the campus, and the community in the direction of his interests. In recent years, through the steady growth of his graduate course in the history of thought, his interest had shifted strongly to the history of ideas. He had just turned his expository skill to a book on the history of philosophy when his brief illness struck him.

Hunter Mead taught psychology along with philosophy. He was highly effective both as a teacher of psychology and as a counselor to many generations of students. As his emphasis in philosophy shifted to history of ideas, he found himself more interested in the history of psychological ideas.

A member of the American Guild of Organists, Professor Mead was an organist, an organ-builder, and a developer of both campus and community music organizations and programs. He counseled and assisted many students interested in music. He became an expert organ builder by building a 950-pipe organ in his home, where he presented recitals by many organists. The Guild has established the Hunter Mead Memorial Scholarship to be awarded annually for the study of organ.

In addition to the Guild and the Philosophical Association, Hunter Mead was a member of the American Society for Aesthetics and of Phi Beta Kappa.

The volume of testimony from his present and former students, from his faculty colleagues, and from others in many sections of the country testifies to the measure of their deep sense of loss and to the impact of Professor Mead as a teacher and a person.

CHARLES E. BURES

CARL FREDERICK TAEUSCH

1889-1961

Carl Frederick Tausch was born at Wapakoneta, Ohio, on January 20, 1889. He attended Wooster College, Princeton University, and Harvard University where he received his Doctor of Philosophy degree in 1920. He had been a high

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school teacher for some years, and he taught Philosophy at the University of Chicago, Tulane University, and the State University of Iowa through the '20's. In 1927, he went to Harvard University as Associate Professor of Ethics where he remained until 1935 in the Graduate School of Business Administration. He then entered the service of the Government with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and remained with it until his association with the Office of Military Government in Berlin in 1946. In 1946 he came to Saint Louis University and began developing a program in Public Administration.

Doctor Tausch had always been deeply interested in problems of Ethics, particularly as these were applied to business and professional fields. His main publications, both in books and in articles, had to do with this application.

Doctor Tausch had been on the editorial board of the *International Journal of Ethics* for many years, and from 1928 to 1935, he was managing editor of the *Harvard Business Review*. He was secretary of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, 1924-1927.

Doctor Tausch was a warm-hearted friend and a vigorous personality and had a questing and stimulating mind. He taught by a directly challenging discussion method. His students were expected to enter into a vigorous dialogue with him. It was for this reason that he found the year in Turkey, 1952-53, as a Visiting Professor difficult since he was required to teach according to a rigid lecture method. Throughout his life, he developed warm friendships, particularly in the academic circles in which he taught and discussed and argued.

In 1955 Doctor Tausch suffered a severe stroke. He courageously set himself to recuperate, and though continuing in poor health and physical disability, managed to teach part time through the academic year 1955-56. Even his brave optimism, however, finally recognized that he needed a much more extended period of rest, and so he requested a leave of absence from the University beginning in the Summer of 1956. He moved then with Mrs. Tausch to Berkeley, California, where he continued to live until his death on September 20, 1961. His passing was a loss to his friends and students and to our academic world.

May he rest in God's Peace.

R. J. HENLE, S.J.

HOWARD J. B. ZIEGLER

1908-1961

The death, on July 16, 1961, of Howard J. B. Ziegler takes from the academic world, and especially from Lehigh University, a man whose character and whose service will long be remembered as exemplary.

Professor Ziegler was born in Reading, Pennsylvania January 20, 1908. A graduate of Franklin and Marshall College in 1930, he received the degree of Bachelor of Divinity in 1933 at Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, and became Master of Sacred Theology at Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia in 1941. His pastoral work was most warmly received, and his loyalties in that and related fields of service were abiding. His increasing interest in philosophic issues led him to resign his ministry at Trinity Evangelical and Reformed Church in Philadelphia and elsewhere in favor of a university career. Until very recent years, however, when health considerations somewhat cur-

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tailed his activities he was called, on innumerable occasions each year, to address or advise church or civic organizations which valued his scholarship and his wisdom. He was well beloved in various religious communities which he served, as a labor of love, until a few weeks before his death.

In pursuit of his philosophic career Howard Ziegler took up graduate studies at Columbia University, joining the Lehigh University faculty as instructor of philosophy and religion in 1947. In 1950 his doctoral degree in philosophy was granted by Columbia University. His dissertation, *Frederick Augustus Rauch: American Hegelian*, was published in 1953.

A marked and immediate increase in student interest in philosophy on the Lehigh University campus rewarded Dr. Ziegler's resourceful teaching. He rose rapidly to full professorship and in 1953 became Head of the Department of Philosophy. He was appointed to the Clara H. Stewardson endowed chair in philosophy in 1956. Those who had the pleasure of working under Professor Ziegler's departmental chairmanship know how tirelessly and selflessly he sought to establish the circumstances which would best contribute to the personal and professional development of each of his departmental colleagues. This devotion to the welfare of those scholars and students whose careers in any measure depended upon him was farsighted and judicious, and was one of the most conspicuous attributes of that generous spirit. That energetic and intelligent dedication to the welfare of others was felt far and near within the world of academic philosophy during those years when he was chairman of the American Philosophical Association's Committee on Information Service.

Students, faculty, and administration alike came to recognize in Professor Ziegler an unusual talent for curriculum guidance and the counseling of students. As a special assistant to the Dean of the Lehigh University College of Arts and Science a considerable portion of Professor Ziegler's time was given over to this type of service, and to related committee work. Increasingly the University availed itself of his judicious mind and moral suasion both in the regulation of its normal affairs and in the resolution of especially difficult matters.

Professor Ziegler's untimely death takes from the academic community and the teaching profession a man of hearty good humor, of unfailing fairness and service, of utterly honest intellect, and of memorable professional bearing.

THOMAS M. HAYNES

CHARLES HILLIS KAISER

1907-1961

On Monday evening, August 7, our colleague, Charles Hillis Kaiser, died suddenly at the age of fifty-four, of a heart attack in the hospital at Brunswick, Maine, near South Harpswell, where he customarily spent the summer with his family. He joined the Department of Philosophy as Assistant Professor in the fall of 1948 and was promoted to Associate Professor in 1952. He ranged widely in philosophy but with special interest as scholar and teacher in aesthetics and the philosophy of science.

Hillis Kaiser—as he liked to be called—was born in Edon, Ohio, awarded the A.B. degree in 1929 at Ohio Wesleyan, the A.M. in 1930 and the Ph.D. in 1934 at Harvard. He began his teaching career as an assistant in philosophy at

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Harvard from 1934 to 1936, during which time he had the enviable privilege of assisting Alfred North Whitehead. The following year, which he spent at the University of Leipzig, was especially cherished by him because of his association with Heisenberg. He then returned to Harvard where he served for a year as tutor and instructor, prior to a full decade of teaching at Middlebury College and Bennington College.

Hillis Kaiser's various articles and reviews were mainly concerned with the bearing of modern physics and mathematics on philosophy and religion. His last published article, "Reason and Scientific Knowledge," (1960) bears the wistful sub-title, "Can the human reason give an exact account of the real unperceived character of the external world?" His compact little book, *An Essay on Method*, (1952) elegantly exemplifies his persistent concern with clarity and order; in distinguishing the four fundamental disciplines of art, science, philosophy, and religion he was laying the foundations for his passionately held philosophy of education.

As a teacher at Rutgers, Hillis Kaiser was conspicuous in his devotion to high standards, and consequently had dramatic encounters with both students and colleagues. He did not waver. But he was always generous when he sensed the presence of quality.

The last years of Hillis Kaiser were devoted to intensive study of quantum mechanics and relativity physics, groping as always toward the ultimate vision. It is tragic indeed that he was unable to bring this devoted work to completion. It is tragic indeed that a fine austere mind in full maturity is lost to this campus. But we shall retain our image of him as a latter-day kinsman of the Pythagoreans, devoted to mathematics and music.

JOSEPH NEVER
HOUSTON PETERSON

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